

Proving and Silencing

How Palestinian Fighters Ended "Annexation" (15 May 1948 – January 1949) in the writings of Qasim Al-Rimawi on al-Jihad al-Muqaddas⁽¹⁾

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Abstract: This paper studies the position of Holy War Army (HWA) (*al-Jihād al-Muqaddas*), the most prominent Palestinian force in the 1947-1949 war, on Jordanian attempts to annex the remainder of central Palestine following the 1948 partition plan. It draws on primary sources written at various points by one of the organisation's most prominent leaders, Qasim Mohammed Al-Rimawi. It lays out al-Rimawi's account of events in his earlier and later writings, tracing how his narrative develops over time through a selected sample, looking for the "silencing" that al-Rimawi engages in throughout his collective works. The paper concludes that a key part of the history of 1947-1949 war, and specifically the experience of Palestinian fighters, has been silenced in various historical sources because of later political developments.

al-Jihād al-Muqaddas

Qasim Al-Rimawi

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

King Abdullah Bin Hussein I

Introduction

With the entry of the Arab forces into Palestine following the British mandate's departure on 15 May 1948, the 1947-1949 war ushered in a new era, characterised militarily by the decline of Palestinian military action in favour of Arab leadership and decision making. This was exacerbated by the deaths of prominent Palestinian military leaders Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini (1908 – 8 April 1948) and Hasan Salameh (1905 – 2 June 1948) and the loss of most of the major cities, which collapsed with the fall of many of the military formations that had been established and matured over the months of clashes between December 1947 and May 1948.

The Palestinian military force operating in the eastern sector of central Palestine, the Holy War Army (HWA) (*Jaysh al-Jihād al-Muqaddas*), was the most prominent

and cohesive of these forces on the eve of the Arab intervention. It retained this position even after the death of its founder and many of its regular soldiers in the April-May battles that took place in and around Jerusalem.⁽³⁾ The HWA also successfully consolidated its power by reuniting the fragmented forces following the occupation of the major Palestinian cities, the last of which were forces led by Salama in the western sector, which collapsed completely with the fall of al-Lidd and Ramleh and their vicinity.

With the entry of the Arab armies into Palestine, the Jordanian Arab Legion took control of the HWA-held areas in the eastern sector of the central region, first seizing Jerusalem and Ramallah, and later Bethlehem and Hebron, following the Egyptian army's withdrawal. The Jordanian government imposed military rule in the areas

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3 Especially those in defence of Jerusalem and countering the Zionist attacks on the Jerusalem-Jaffa road that began with "Operation Nachshon" at the beginning of April 1948. These were followed by successive Zionist military operations aimed at completing the occupation of the villages adjacent to this main road.

under its control from May 1948, followed by practical measures on the ground that went beyond the powers of the military rule imposed by other Arab armies. These actions indicated a clear Jordanian desire to take full control over the rest of Palestine and expand the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This intention was officially confirmed with the announcement of Jordan's annexation of what remained of Palestine on 24 April 1950.

The position of the Palestinian forces, which were directly subject to the Higher Arab Authority of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, its king and army, before and after May 1948, have been under-researched, as has their response to the gradual steps taken by Jordan to annex the remainder of Palestine and the position of Palestinians on that decision. But the move had a great impact on the future of Palestine, and potentially on the continuity of Palestinian armed resistance as an organized act. There are limited exceptions, most notably the writings of those who stayed in the National Liberation League, who highlighted the League's objection to the annexation, and the writings of some figures opposing the Jordanian regime at the time,⁽⁴⁾ as well as some research that came later in the aftermath of the September 1970 incidents and the struggle of the Palestine Liberation Organization against the Jordanian regime.⁽⁵⁾

This study examines the attitude of the HWA towards the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, its king and

army, and its response to the annexation process. The research is based on published primary sources written by the late Qasim al-Rimawi (1918-1982), one of the most prominent founders and leaders of the HWA, who would go on to become Prime Minister of Jordan.⁽⁶⁾ The study will examine the evolution of al-Rimawi's narrative over time, through a selected sample, seeking out the acts of silencing practiced by al-Rimawi in his various texts and the reasons behind it. Influenced by Michel-Rolph Trouillot's hypothesis,⁽⁷⁾ the paper will examine al-Rimawi's historical recollections as well as the process of the historical production of the event, by researching the context and production process of al-Rimawi's texts.

According to Trouillot, the act of silencing is not limited to a specific moment but enters "the process of historical production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of *sources*); the moment of fact assembly (the making of *archives*); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of *narratives*); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of *history* in the final instance)."⁽⁸⁾ Before Trouillot, the French school of methodology had already documented the necessity of subjecting primary sources to internal and external critique.⁽⁹⁾ The importance of these processes is multiplied in cases where texts are based on memory, affected by restrictions or distortions of historical context at the moment of retrospection.⁽¹⁰⁾

First: al-Rimawi and the Early Days of the Holy War Army

That evening, Abd al-Qadir came to the house and met with us, saying: 'The best resistance

is to arm ourselves, to take independence by force. I ask you both to come to my house, so I

4 See, for example, the memoirs of the Jordanian officer, and former military governor of Jerusalem, Abdullah Tal: Abdullah Tal, *Kāritha Filasṭīn: Mudhakhirāt 'Abdullah al-Tal Qā'id Ma'raka al-Quds*, 2nd ed. (Kafr Qara: Dar Al-Huda, 1990), pp. 367-406, 581-583.

5 See, for example: 'Iṣṣam Sakhnin, "Ḍamm Filasṭīn ila Sharq al-Urdun 1948-1950," *Shu'ūn Filasṭīniyya*, no. 40 (December 1974), pp. 56-83. The September 1970 events were preceded by a Nasserist-Jordanian conflict, about which texts appeared that partially dealt with the annexation, including: Jamāl Ḥamdān, "al-Urdun Dawla: Dirāsa fī al-Jughrāfiya al-Siyāsiyya," *al-Kātib*, no. 70 (January 1967), pp. 21-40.

6 Bilal Mohammed Shalash, *Dākhil as-Sūr al-Qadīm: Nuṣūṣ Qasim Al-Rimawi 'An al-Jihād al-Muqaddas* (Beirut: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2020).

7 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past Power and the Production of History* (Bosten: Beacon Press books, 1995), pp. 24-26.

8 Ibid.

9 See: *an-Naqd at-tārīkhī*, Abdelrahman Badawi (trans.), 4th ed. (Kuwait: Printing Agency, 1981).

10 There is a great deal of research interest in history and memory, and among the most prominent of these works are: Jacques Le Gough, *History and Memory*, Jamal Sheheid (trans.) (Doha / Beirut: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2018); Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Georges Zenati (trans.) (Beirut: United New Book House, 2009).

can teach you to make explosives and bombs. We do not want a "divorce" or a protest. We want to fight them with their own weapons. Henceforth, we began to visit him, and learned how to make explosives.⁽¹¹⁾

These words document Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini's early relationship with Qasim al-Rimawi during the Great Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939. While al-Rimawi was in his final year in the Rashidiya School, he and his classmates walked out in a demonstration marking the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1935, which would be suppressed by British soldiers. After dispersing the demonstrators, the Brits arrested al-Rimawi and his classmate Farid Ahmad al-Ouri (1915-1936), accusing them of organising the demonstration. Husseini intervened, which resulted in their release, and that evening, the meeting that al-Rimawi described above heralded a sustained relationship.

Qasim al-Rimawi was born in the village of Beit Rima, northwest of Ramallah, on 11 January 1918, days after the fall of Jerusalem and its suburbs to the occupying British forces that launched their attack on Palestine and the whole of the Levant from their Egyptian bases after the failure of the Ottoman Empire and its allies to use Palestine as a forward base to attack Egypt and North Africa. As was customary, al-Rimawi joined public education, then finished elementary, middle, and high school at the Rashidiya School and the Arab College in Jerusalem. After obtaining his high school diploma in 1936, he began to work as an accountant in the General Postal Service,⁽¹²⁾ in parallel with the outbreak of the Great Palestinian Revolt against the British occupation of 1936-1939.

The Revolt made Husseini a celebrity and provides the first signs of a growing relationship between Husseini

and al-Rimawi. Months after this incident, Jerusalem witnessed an exceptional event, as Sami Al Ansari (1918-1936) and Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah (1916-2012) carried out an assassination attempt on British Assistant Superintendent Alan Sigris on 12 June 1936. While both hit the target, Ansari was caught off guard and wounded by the bullet of one of Sigris's escorts, fleeing the scene with the help of a bystander.⁽¹³⁾ The unidentified passer-by was not mentioned in Abu Gharbiyah's memoirs but turned out to be al-Rimawi, who was arrested this time on charges of attempting to assassinate Sigris for rescuing Al Ansari (who later died in the hospital). Here, Husseini, who became the director of the Arab Party in Jerusalem, appears again, defending al-Rimawi by recruiting lawyers for him, until he was released on the grounds that the charge was not proven.⁽¹⁴⁾ A few days after the attempted assassination of Sigris, Farid al-Ouri, who had been arrested with al-Rimawi in his first detention, was martyred while manufacturing a bomb for use in the revolution.⁽¹⁵⁾

Picture 1



Front row from right: Qasim al-Rimawi, Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini, Kamel Erekat, Malek al-Husseini, Photo: Khalil Rassas, Bidya, January 1948. Source: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Archive.

11 Qasim al-Rimawi, "Makhtūṭ al-Shahīd Abd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī," Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Palestinian National Movement Project Archives, manuscript no. 1/d.

12 "His Excellency Qasim al-Rimawi," *Supplement to the Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 1/01/1963, p. 26; Ya'qūb Al-'Awdāt, *Min A'lām al-Fikr wa al-Adab fī Filasṭīn* (Jerusalem: Dar Al-Israa, 1992), p. 224.

13 Bahjat Abū Gharbīya, *Mudhakirāt al-Munāḍil Bahjat Abū Gharbīya 1916-1949: Fī Khiḍam al-Niḍāl al-'Arabī al-Filasṭīnī* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993), p. 75. For details of the assassination, see: pp. 72-77. See also: Matthew Hughes, "A History of Violence: The Shooting in Jerusalem of British Assistant Police Superintendent Alan Sigris, 12 June 1936," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 45, no. 4 (October 2010), pp. 725-743.

14 Qasim al-Rimawi, "Makhtūṭ al-Shahīd Abd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī," Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Palestinian National Movement Project Archives, manuscript no. 1/d.

15 Farid Ahmad al-Ouri was martyred in early June 1936, while preparing an explosive device in a house in Wadi Al-Joz in Jerusalem for use in the revolution. See: Davar, 2 June 1936, p. 7. [Hebrew].

With the Second World War drawing to a close, the Palestinians began to re-establish the political forces that had been crushed during the years of revolt and war, first among them the Arab Party. With the revival of the Arab Party, al-Rimawi was chosen

to preside over its office in Jerusalem, the party's main headquarters. He also contributed to editing *Al-Wahda* newspaper, the unofficial mouthpiece of the party (1945-1947), helping to qualify him for his next role with Husseini after settling in Egypt.

Second: Early Texts: Qasim al-Rimawi the Combatant

The indelible image from the memory of Qasim al-Rimawi is the one that we saw as children, with him wearing militant clothing and weapons on his chest. He was in the HWA with the late Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini, and he was one of his most prominent men. His image, like that of Abd al-Qadir, Fawzi Al-Qawuqji, Said Al-'Aas and other fighters, remained a symbol of the Palestinian memory.⁽¹⁶⁾

After al-Rimawi's death, he was remembered mostly, as evidenced by the Ibrahim Abu Nab article,⁽¹⁷⁾ in his image as a HWA leader, close to Husseini. Today, he is rarely remembered for his ministerial work in several Jordanian cabinets, his role in the Jordanian parliament, or the positions he held in the various institutions and bodies after the end of his military career. This presence of al-Rimawi as a leader in HWA is also most prominent in the literature on Palestinian history. Some of his texts, published or manuscript, are the most prominent sources of all that has been written about the army, past and present, or the life and activities of its founder, Husseini. Many later sources have relied on al-Rimawi's manuscript about Husseini by way of Isa Khalil Mohsen's biographical work in Arabic, *Mother Palestine and her Righteous Son, Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini*, which used the manuscript as a major reference.

Al-Rimawi, as Mohsen tells it, was active with in HWA from the outset. It began when Husseini travelled from the Hijaz to settle in Egypt in February 1946, following the end of the Second World War. Husseini had decided to work anew to establish a secret military organization in preparation for the

upcoming battle of Palestine, and finish off the earlier revolt. This effort was doubled following the arrival of Haj Amin Al-Husseini to Egypt in late May 1946, and the formation of Arab Higher Committee, when Husseini became responsible for military affairs in the committee, enabling him to draw up its new organizational structure.⁽¹⁸⁾

December 1947 saw the first sparks of a war that would not officially end until the signing of the final armistice agreements in Rhodes, between the nascent Zionist State and Syria, on 20 July 1949. With this spark, *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas*, and some of its founding cells, began undertaking defensive military activity in the early engagement. During this stage, al-Rimawi worked to coordinate the support of the Jerusalem area with combatants from the Ramallah district, as well as the transfer of arms to Jerusalem from the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Military Committee, until Husseini returned to Palestine to establish a semi-regular military force, concentrated in the eastern part of the central region. In February 1948, the Higher Arab Military Committee approved Husseini's leadership, in conjunction with Hasan Salama, of the western central region. The remaining regions and city garrisons were entrusted to Arab leaders, along with local leaders, who, according to al-Rimawi's text, at one stage formed the solid core of the new Husseini organization.

Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini and his forces active in the eastern sector of the central region succeeded, during the first months of the war, in carrying out a series of defensive and offensive operations. During these months of engagement, al-Rimawi accompanied

16 Ibrahim Abū Nāb, "Abu Ḥātim," *Al Ra'i* (Jordan), 01/05/1982, p. 19.

17 Ibid.

18 Al-Rimawi, "Makhtūṭ al-Shahīd", Notebook no. 4; Qasim al-Rimawi, "ba'd Kitāb Yā Quds: al-Ḥaqīqa Kamā 'Arifūhā wa 'Ishtuhā (3)," *Ad-Dustour*, 21/08/1972, p. 4; Muhammad Izza Darwaza, *Mudhakirāt Muḥammad 'Izza Darwaza, Sajal Ḥāfil bi-masīra al-Ḥarika al-'Arabiya wa al-Qaḍīya al-Filasṭīniya khilāl Qarn min 1305-1404 AH / 1887-1984 AD*, vol. 5 (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1993), p. 593.

Husseini on his local tours, calling on people to fight and unite behind the gun. He joined him in planning and executing various military operations, or in his foreign trips to coordinate or request support from the Arab Higher Military Committee, which had become the main authority in determining the general strategy for the active forces in Palestine, competing with the Arab Higher Committee, and its leader, Haj Amin al-Husseini, disputed control of the local forces, which were headed mainly by Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini and Hasan Salama.

The elevated village of al-Qastal that controlled the Jerusalem-Jaffa road was a main target of the Zionist Operation Nachshon in early April 1948,¹⁹ as part of the plan to take control of all the Arab sites threatening the supply route to the Zionist neighbourhoods in Jerusalem. The town fell on 4 April 1948, while Husseini and al-Rimawi were in Damascus to meet with the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Military Committee.

After that, Husseini returned to Jerusalem, to begin the battle to retrieve al-Qastal, a battle that would lead to his martyrdom on 8 April 1948. Al-Rimawi was left alone and Khaled Sharif al-Husseini (1910-1951) was appointed as the new general commander of the HWA forces, moving the headquarters of the leadership to Jerusalem, instead of maintaining Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini's former headquarters in Birzeit. Al-Rimawi thus became the commander of the Birzeit forces, fighting his battles almost independently of the general headquarter in Jerusalem, and of the HWA forces elsewhere.

In the months following the martyrdom of Husseini, al-Rimawi fought in a number of major battles, including Bab al-Wad in May and Ras al-Ayn, where Husseini's partner in leading the local forces, Hasan Salama, was martyred. Al-Rimawi also worked, from his position at the HWA headquarter in Birzeit, to unite the scattered forces of Hasan Salama, coordinating

his efforts with the Iraqi forces that entered Palestine with other Arab armies after 15 May 1948.

This coordination with the Iraqi forces, which was established, according to al-Rimawi's texts, with mutual trust, was accompanied by a tense and often bad relationship with the Jordanian forces. The relationship worsened with the start of the administrative activity to incorporate what remained of Palestine under the control of these forces into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This relationship was based on an extensive legacy of tensions between King Abdullah I bin Al-Hussein (1882-1951) and Haj Amin al-Husseini (1897-1974), which worsened with al-Rimawi, and supporters of the Arab Higher Committee in general, who stood against Jordan's efforts to eliminate the existence of any independent Palestinian entity or organized military force.

This tension reached a head with the decision of the Jordanian army to take over the HWA headquarter in the town of Birzeit in January 1949, after several rounds of tug-of-war, detailed by al-Rimawi in some of his texts investigated here. Al-Rimawi's military experience also came to an end with the dissolution of the HWA. He moved to Cairo in 1949, settling next to Haj Amin al-Husseini, and working as a secretary for the All-Palestine Government.

At this stage, al-Rimawi wrote down what is believed to be his first text on his HWA experience. He presented a 40-page handwritten report to Haj Amin al-Husseini, that he called *The Actions that Occurred during the Battle of Palestine, Particularly the Position of the HWA Leadership after the Martyrdom of Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini, and How the Arrangements they Followed Prevented the Establishment of the Absolute Sovereignty of the Arab Higher Committee in Palestine*.²⁰

After much to and froing, and a feeling of despair from the Arab and Palestinian leaders and politicians,

19 In late March and early April 1948, the Zionists launched a series of military operations, implementing "Plan Dalet." These operations (Operation Nahshon, Operation Harel, and Operation Yevusi) sought to occupy the main Arab sites in Jerusalem and on the road leading to. However, many of these operations failed to occupy some Palestinian villages and towns, most significantly Operation Yevusi in the Bedouin area of Nabi Samuel. For more on the Zionist operations in April in the Jerusalem area, see: Aref Al-Aref, *al-Nakba; Nakba Bayt al-Maqdis wa al-Bayt al-Mafqūd 1947-1949, al-Juzu' al-Awal min Qarār al-taqsim 11/29/1947 ila bud' al-Hudna al-ūla, 11/6/1948* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2012), pp. 176-186, 273, 281-287; Yehuda Slutsky, *History of the Haganah: From Resistance to War*, vol. 2, part 3 (Tel Aviv: Zionist Library, 1972) [Hebrew], pp. 1575-1579; Alon Kadash & Moshe Arnold (eds.), *The Battle of Jebusi* (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry Publishing, 2008). [Hebrew].

20 Qasim al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr Makhtūṭ Muqaddim ila Hajj Amin al-Hussayni," dated 1949, archived in Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Palestinian National Movement Project Archives, p. 1.

Picture 2



Front row from left: Qasim al-Rimawi, Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini, Kamel Erekat, Malek al-Husseini. Photo: Khalil Rassas, Biddya, January 1948. Source: Haganah Archive.

and from the Arab armies, al-Rimawi went on to finish off his education at the American University in Cairo, receiving a bachelor's degree in Sociology in 1952. He also devoted himself to narrating his and Husseini's experience, bitterly affected by the sense of loss and defeat. His second text on this experience was an article published in the Egyptian newspaper, *al-Jumhūr al-Masriyya*, on 9 April 1951, on the anniversary of Husseini's death. It contains a

summary of "the objectives Plan," the central plan drawn up by Husseini to begin the battle in Palestine to challenge United Nations partition decision.

In addition to this article, it is clear from the texts that al-Rimawi was determined to write a complete biography of Abd al-Qadir Al-Husseini. For this he had set up a preliminary structure, dividing the book into nine main themes and handwriting a first draft for most of them in various notebooks and papers.

Third: Later texts: Qasim al-Rimawi, the Palestinian/Jordanian Politician

It was possible that the picture would be frozen in memory in that moment. But after 1949, Abu Hatem surprised us by changing it. He had to put aside his weapon and come down from the mountains of Palestine. But he did not sit on

his laurels or spend all his time talking about the old days. Instead he went off to Columbia University [...] After he came back, his voice was calm as if the violence had left him. But in fact the violence had moved to his mind. He

had realized that you have to think first and then turn this thinking into practice, into plans to be executed in reality.⁽²¹⁾

Qasim al-Rimawi did not stay in Egypt, as he travelled to the United States of America, after the All-Palestine Government chose him to be its observer at the United Nations.⁽²²⁾ He used his travels to complete his higher education, pursuing a master's degree in Administration and Social Affairs⁽²³⁾ at Columbia University in New York in 1953 and then going on to receive a PhD from Columbia's Teachers College in 1956.⁽²⁴⁾

Al-Rimawi left the United States following the Suez Crisis of October 1956, returning to Cairo at the beginning of 1957. Political changes in Jordan starting in April 1956 saw al-Rimawi return to the Hashemite Kingdom to create a new image of himself, far removed from the HWA soldier, taking advantage of his academic attainment and experiences at Columbia. In 1957, he became manager of the Jordan Phosphate Mines Co. PLC, a position he held until early 1960. His new persona was seemingly unaffected by the political changes and the royal coup against the opposition.⁽²⁵⁾ Henceforth, the first signs of shifts in his old political positions began to appear.

In anticipation of re-entering political life in the Kingdom of Jordan, al-Rimawi began communicating

with King Hussein bin Talal (1952-1999), who was known for his cordiality with his former opponents. On 28 December 1960, Rimawi sent a letter to the King, requesting that he endorse al-Rimawi's bid to be allowed to carry out a study on Jordanians on scholarships abroad, which had been proposed by the United States Point Four Program.⁽²⁶⁾ This letter was a first step towards a reconciliation with the establishment, in particular the security establishment. When the king instructed the prime minister to meet with al-Rimawi and help him in his study,⁽²⁷⁾ the prime minister immediately asked the Minister of Interior to facilitate a certificate of good conduct for al-Rimawi and grant him the necessary access for his work.⁽²⁸⁾ The Minister of the Interior responded with a letter to the Director of Public Security fulfilling this request.⁽²⁹⁾

The rapid response of the competent authorities, then a meeting with the king, encouraged al-Rimawi to send another letter furthering his reputation as an expert. This time, al-Rimawi proposed a joint project with the lawyer Fouad Houry, which he described as a practical program for implementing the public policy of participation and cooperation called for by the King, in an effort to narrow the gap between citizens and officials.⁽³⁰⁾ Once again the king responded with

21 Abu Nāb, p.19.

22 "His Excellency Qasim al-Rimawi," p. 27; Al-Awdat, p. 225.

23 Qasim Mohamed al-Rimawi, "The Role of the Social Worker in Industrial Community Development in Egypt," Master's Dissertation, Columbia University, Social Work, New York, 1954.

24 Qasim Mohamed al-Rimawi, "Education and the Challenge of Industrialization in Egypt: a Report of a Type B Project," PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, Teachers College, New York, 1956. Published in Beirut also, see: Qasim Mohamed al-Rimawi, *The Challenge of Industrialization, Egypt* (Beirut: United Publishers, 1974).

25 Al-Rimawi commented on this period in a public speech in April 1960, indicating that with the imposition of martial law and the arrest of a number of people, he did not try to mediate with anyone. He added that after the demise of the rule of law, everyone governed themselves in the interest of Jordan's stability, see: *Palestine*, April 7, 1960, p. 4. This conversation reveals al-Rimawi distanced himself from the political differences in April 1957, and that his activity was limited, apparently, to his work in the Phosphate Company.

26 "Istidā' min Qāsim Muḥammad al-Rimāwī ila al-Malik Ḥussayn," Government Archives, Department of the Jordanian National Library, Document No.181/6/6/37, dated 2/12/1960.

27 "Kitāb min Rāīs al-Diwan al-Malaki al-Hāshimī ila Rāīs al-Wuzurā'," Government Archives, Department of the Jordanian National Library, Document No.182/6/6/37, dated 29/12/1960.

28 "Kitāb min Rāīs al-Wuzurā' ila Wazīr al-Dākhiliyya," Government Archives, Department of the Jordanian National Library, Document No.183/6/6/37, dated 02/01/1961.

29 "Kitāb min Wazīr al-Dākhiliyya ila Mudīr al-'Amn al-'ām," Government Archives, Department of the Jordanian National Library, Document No.184/6/6/37, dated 03/01/1961.

30 "Kitāb min al-Duktūr Qāsim al-Rimāwī ila Jalāla Malik Ḥusayn," Government Archives, Department of the Jordanian National Library, Document No. 17/7/6/37, 18/7/6/37, 19/7/6/37, 20/7/6/37, dated 17/02/1961.

a letter to Parliament,⁽³¹⁾ which in turn wrote to six ministries, requesting further investigation.⁽³²⁾

While these documents do not reveal what happened as a result of the investigations by the relevant ministries, al-Rimawi had clearly begun to chart a path back into political circles. His first practical measure was to stand for parliament in October 1961, when he was elected as the representative of the Ramallah district.⁽³³⁾ Within less than a month, he was clashing with the Bahjat al-Talhouni ministry, refusing to vote on a motion put forward by the king on the grounds that it did not constitute a formal ministerial proposal.⁽³⁴⁾

Talhouni resigned on 27 January 1962, and Wasfi Tal (1919-1971) formed his first government. Al-Rimawi was appointed Minister of Agriculture, Reconstruction and Development, marking his first taste of governmental activity as well as the beginning of a budding relationship with Wasfi Tal. Al-Rimawi resigned from his position on 14 October 1962 in preparation for the November parliamentary elections,⁽³⁵⁾ in which he won a second term as Ramallah's representative.⁽³⁶⁾ He was re-appointed Minister of Agriculture the following month,⁽³⁷⁾ but the government was dissolved in March 1963 amid political unrest and demonstrations stemming from the three-way unity talks between Egypt, Syria and Iraq (suppressed in a major state crackdown). Samir Rifai was tasked with forming a new cabinet, but in an unexpected turn of events, most of the members of parliament withheld confidence from his government.

Al-Rimawi was among the MPs who withheld confidence from the government on 20 April 1963.

In his speech, he expressed the popular hopes related to achieving rapid unity with other Arab countries, but questioned Rifai's ability to be the bearer of that message of unity, as he would have to be convinced of all that the concept entailed.⁽³⁸⁾ The king's anger that parliament withheld confidence from the Rifai government was reflected in the dissolution of the House of Representatives after appointing a new government headed by Shareef Hussein ibn Nasser, and then arresting a number of MPs to be sent to Al-Jafr prison.⁽³⁹⁾ The unity talks between Egypt, Syria and Iraq failed, and the situation in Jordan remained relatively stable. Al-Rimawi returned to parliament on 6 July 1963, but this time he was effectively appointed by the government, and it was understood that these lists were prepared to benefit the government and to punish certain personalities by depriving them of their seats.

It was not long before the signs of an attempt to establish a new Palestinian entity appeared on the horizon, part of an initiative by the United Arab Republic. Following the Palestinian Conference in Jerusalem, the first executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, chaired by Ahmad al-Shukeiri (1908-1980) was announced on 10 August 1964. Al-Rimawi was among the members of its first executive committee. Jordan felt the threat of this new entity to its own unity, cooperating at first cautiously with the PLO. During the consultations he held when forming his government, which was declared on 13 February 1965, Wasfi Tal sought to have some members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee occupy

31 "Kitāb min Rāis al-Dīwān al-Malaki al-Hāshimī ila Rāis al-Wuzurā'," Government Archives, Department of the Jordanian National Library, Document No. 21/7/6/37, dated 21/02/1961.

32 "Kitāb min Wakīl Rāis al-Wuzurā' ila Wazīr al-Tarbīyya wa al-Ta'lim," Government Archives, Department of the Jordanian National Library, Document No. 22/7/6/37, dated 01/03/1961.

33 Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, No. 1577 (21/10/1961), p. 1370. Al-Rimawi had the highest vote according to the declared election results, with 4,797 votes.

34 "Mudhakarāt wa Munāqishāt Majlis al-'Umma al-Urdunī al-Sādis" Majlis al-'Umma, *Supplement to the Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, vol. 6, no. 4 (26/11/1961), p. 131.

35 *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 1644 (15/10/1962), p. 1212.

36 *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 1652 (27/11/1962), p. 1433. In these elections, al-Rimawi received 4,593 votes.

37 *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 1655 (03/12/1962), p. 1461.

38 "Mudhakarāt wa Munāqishāt Majlis al-'Umma al-Urdunī al-Sābi'" Majlis al-'Umma, *Supplement to the Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, vol. 7, no. 17 (21/04/1963), pp. 1084-1085.

39 For the experience of one of the MPs detained in Al-Jafr following the withdrawal of confidence from the Al-Rifai government, see: Samih Hammouda, "Maqdisi fī Sajj Al-Jafr: Yawmīyāt wa Mudhakarāt Dāwūd Al-Ḥusayni," *Hawliyyat al-Quds*, no. 16 (Autumn/Winter 2013), pp. 86-98.

posts in the new government as ministers of state, while retaining their membership of the committee, specifically, Abdul Khaleq Yaghmour and al-Rimawi. Accepting the offer, Shukeiri tried to persuade the members of the executive committee to agree, but the majority considered it an attempt to contain the PLO's influence and turn it into a governing body in Jordan. Accordingly, the offer was rejected by most of the committee members besides Shukeiri and al-Rimawi.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Despite the need to cooperate with it, a government was formed following the executive committee's refusal to participate. However, the relationship between the PLO and Jordan worsened, and al-Rimawi, as is clear from his public statements, rejected this dispute, which escalated to the complete severance of Jordan's relations with the PLO, which was accused of sabotaging the state.

Al-Rimawi retained membership of the executive committee for a limited period, as it was dissolved on 31 May 1965, with the start of the second Palestinian National Congress, which was held in Cairo, and was replaced by a committee of entirely new members.⁽⁴¹⁾ During this short period, the available sources do not reveal much about al-Rimawi's role in the committee, which seems to have been limited to leading the PLO delegation to various Latin American countries, and representing it in a number of official meetings. Some of al-Rimawi's colleagues accused Shukeiri of excluding him during his leadership of the committee.⁽⁴²⁾

With al-Rimawi's departure from the PLO executive committee, he returned to the Jordanian government, after Tal's decision to reshuffle his cabinet, becoming the Minister of Interior and Urban and Rural Affairs on 31 July 1965.⁽⁴³⁾ Al-Rimawi maintained this

position with Tal's next reshuffle on 22 December 1966,⁽⁴⁴⁾ until the government resigned in March 1967 due to the desire of various ministers (including al-Rimawi) to participate in parliamentary elections held on 15 April 1967,⁽⁴⁵⁾ where al-Rimawi secured his seat again.⁽⁴⁶⁾ He was also elected as Speaker of the House of Representatives after obtaining 42 votes against 17 abstentions.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Not long after the outbreak of the June 1967 war, in which the Kingdom of Jordan lost the parts of Palestine that it had previously annexed, al-Rimawi lost his electoral base as Ramallah fell under occupation. As a result of this war, the PLO gained a lot of traction, and most of the guerrilla factions used Jordan as a forward station for their forces and military bases, which quickly expanded. This presence expanded after the Battle of Karameh in March 1968, with the historic moment of defeating the Zionists strengthening the image of Palestinian factions internally and externally. These factions soon took control of the PLO.

In the wake of the defeat, a higher advisory council that would support the king's decisions was formed. As Speaker of the parliament al-Rimawi was an *ex officio* member of this council. During his time in this post, al-Rimawi presented a memorandum conveying certain popular demands, turning some powerful entities within the Jordanian regime against him. A decision was made to remove him from his position as Speaker,⁽⁴⁸⁾ to be replaced by Kamel Erekat (1906-1984), who had earlier been selected as the deputy speaker of the parliament. Just as he had adhered to the decision of the executive committee under Shukeiri not to participate in Tal's government,

40 Bahjat Abū Gharbīya, *Mudhakkirāt al-Munāḍil Bahjat Abū Gharbīya: Min al-Nakba ila al-Intifāda (1949-2000)* (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 2004), pp. 276-277.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 1864 (01/08/1965) p. 1207.

44 *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 1973 (25/12/1966) p. 2706.

45 *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 1990 (05/03/1967) p. 328.

46 *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 1999 (18/04/1967) p. 585. Al-Rimawi won the highest number of votes in Ramallah district, with 4,561 votes.

47 "Mudhakkirāt wa Munāqishāt Majlis al-'Umma al-Tāsi'," *Supplement to the Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, vol. 12, no. 1 (25/04/1963), p. 10.

48 Akram Zuaiter, *Yawmīyāt Akram Zu'aytar: Sanawāt al'Azma 1967-1970*, Muin al-Taher, Nafez Abu Hasna & Heba Amara (prep.), Memory of Palestine Series (Doha/Beirut: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2019), p. 253; Samih Hammouda, *Sawt min al-Quds: al-Mujāhid Dāwūd Sāliḥ al-Hussayni min Khilāl Mudhakkirātihi wa Awrāqīhi* (Ramallah: Dar Al-Fikr Library Publications, 2015), p. 493.

al-Rimawi refused to join Abdul Wahab Al-Majali's new government without express permission from PLO leader Yasser Arafat. When Arafat vetoed Majali in support of Abdelmunim Rifai as prime minister,⁽⁴⁹⁾ al-Rimawi joined the cabinet formed on 27 June 1970 as Minister of Interior and Urban and Rural Affairs and Minister of Agriculture, with Arafat's permission.⁽⁵⁰⁾

Al-Rimawi remained in this position until confrontations between the Palestinian groups and the Jordanian state escalated and the government was dissolved. Brigadier Mohammad Daoud Al-Abbasi was appointed as Prime Minister to lead the first military government on 15 September 1970, hailing the beginning of a new era for Palestinians in Jordan, with many Palestinian citizens and factions leaving the country. Al-Rimawi was among those who stayed. However, on 28 November 1971, he suffered a personal loss with the assassination of his long-time friend and ministerial colleague Wasfi Tal. This incident deeply affected al-Rimawi, who, on 9 September 1971, was appointed to the king's newly created Royal Committee for Jerusalem,⁽⁵¹⁾ and prompted him to participate in a coup against the PLO leadership, which was dealt a major blow in its expulsion from Jordan. According to the available sources, a few days after the assassination of Tal, on 12 December, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of the former Jordanian minister Naim Abdul Hadi (1912-1996), at the house of the former head of the PLO, Ahmed al-Shukeiri, in the presence of forty Palestinian personalities including al-Rimawi.⁽⁵²⁾

A statement was issued on behalf of the Oversight Committee in the Arab Republic of Egypt condemning "mistakes concerning the Palestinian cause." It spoke first of the "necessity of correcting the course of Palestinian action within the PLO. Second, holding a general Palestinian national conference, which studies the Palestinian cause in all its political,

financial, military and administrative aspects, and the requirements of the present stage of Palestinian action. And, third, Forming a committee of those gathered, whose mission is to make contact with Palestinian groups, to exchange opinions with them, and to collect their proposals on the matter." The committee included al-Rimawi and four others.⁽⁵³⁾

This committee apparently failed to achieve its goals but served instead as a prelude to a campaign against al-Rimawi, spearheaded by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). On 12 December, the spokesperson for the DFLP's Information Committee stated that "Jordanian reactionism pushed Qasim al-Rimawi to carry out hostile activities against our people, seeking to contain the resistance movement, in alliance with right-wing and reactionary elements that the resistance movement has overtaken." The statement added: "Indeed, al-Rimawi met with a number of Palestinian feudatory families and bourgeois figures in Cairo, to come out against the masses, and, disrespectfully, to form an alleged preparatory committee calling for a Palestinian general conference outside the PLO, practically and objectively. All this contributes to creating an alternative to the Palestinian resistance movement, and [represents] the reactionary Palestinian figures within Hussein bin Talal's operation."⁽⁵⁴⁾

This personal attack seemed to have hurt al-Rimawi, and he turned to academic work, taking a position as a part-time lecturer in philosophy and sociology at the University of Jordan. The impact of this on al-Rimawi, in that period and onwards, is described in the testimony of his friend Dr Daoud Saleh Al-Husseini (1903-1993).⁽⁵⁵⁾

During this time, guerrilla activity peaked in Jordan, and al-Rimawi set out to write HWA once again. He published an article in *al-Difā'* newspaper on 9 April 1970, on the anniversary of Abd al-Qadir

49 Ibid., pp. 370-371

50 Ibid., p. 374; *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 2247 (28/06/1970) p. 908. Compare with Hammouda, *Sawt min al-Quds*, pp. 449-450.

51 'Iṣṣām Sakhnīni (ed.), *al-Yawmīyyāt al-Filasṭīniyya*, vol. 14, 1/7/1971-31/12/1971 (Beirut: Research Center - Palestine Liberation Organization, 1973), p. 301.

52 Ibid., p. 636.

53 Dr. Fāḍil Zaydān, *Fārūq Al-Ḥussaynī, Sa'īd Al-'Azza, 'ūdeh Butrus 'ūdeh*, see: Ibid.

54 Ibid., p. 640

55 Hammouda, *Sawt min al-Quds*, pp. 492-493.

al-Husseini's martyrdom, in which he spoke mainly about Husseini's last trip to Damascus, and his betrayal at the hands of Arabs. Following the attack by PLO factions, al-Rimawi fought back with an unusual intensity, recalling his HWA memories in a series of articles published weekly in *Ad-Dustour* newspaper from 7 August -18 December 1972.

This series of articles were an explicit response to claims made in the book *O Jerusalem!* by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, after historian Suleiman Al-Musa published partial translations of the book in the same newspaper. However, the

nature of al-Rimawi's articles and the "silencing" he engaged in indicates an ulterior motive. This is especially true after the third instalment, which was certainly affected by the period in which it was published. He clearly intended to restore his status as a Palestinian, to remind those who attacked him of Qasim al-Rimawi, the fighter, and to document his narrative about the history of the HWA and his position in history. He also sought to provide a new reading of the history of the 1947-1949 war, as one that established blood unity between the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples, shaken by the bloodshed of September 1970.

Fourth: On the Two Characters of Qasim al-Rimawi

Al-Rimawi and Jordan were first connected by the war. His first trip was to transfer a weapon that the Arab military commission handed over to HWA in December 1947, to strengthen the Jerusalem area. But this connection was also founded on an inherent suspicion – even hostility – towards the Jordanian monarchy. This hostility towards the regime and towards some Jordanian personalities who fought in the 1947-1949 war is quite clear in his early writings and had a clear influence on what was documented and what was "silenced." But in his later writings as al-Rimawi the Palestinian-Jordanian politician, a different picture emerges:

The first bond between the two peoples was a shared belief in God, the willingness to sacrifice, the principle of belief in God, the revolution to [preserve] the dignity of the Arab nation and to defend freedom, honour and homeland. This united struggle [jihad] came before [this] united government, which has made explicit, and strengthened, the unity of two peoples who are, in reality and historically, one people.⁽⁵⁶⁾

This is a summary of al-Rimawi's position on annexation, or what he calls "united government." This text was not the first evidence of al-Rimawi's position as a Palestinian/Jordanian politician on "annexation." A previous statement by al-Rimawi in

a collection of his late texts on HWA reflected his first recorded declaration of this position. In late March 1960, Jordan announced the failure of an attempt to assassinate its prime minister, Hazza' Majali, and Sharif Nasser bin Jamil, by order of the Baathist leader Abdullah al-Rimawi (1920-1980). Subsequently, a delegation from the al-Rimawi family went to the Majali president to "denounce the conspiracy and declare allegiance to Hussein." As spokesman of the delegation, Qasim al-Rimawi set out his position on the annexation quite clearly: "The unification of the [East and West] banks took place, as is well known, under the late King Abdullah I, absolutely freely and willingly [...] A united Arab front and true Arab unity is everyone's goal and everyone's desire."⁽⁵⁷⁾

However, al-Rimawi's early texts demonstrate that he engaged in the act of silencing in his later texts, given that the fighter al-Rimawi had, especially in his manuscript report, documented details that contradicted the concept of the "annexation" described by the later Jordanian/Palestinian politician al-Rimawi. Al-Rimawi's manuscript report constitutes a qualitative addition to the historical narratives related to the war, and to Palestinian-Jordanian relations, in the period that followed the entry of the Arab armies into Palestine, after 15 May 1948, and in the interrelationships of HWA leaders.

56 Al-Rimawi, "ba'd Kitāb Yā Quds (3)," p. 4.

57 See: *Filaṣṭīn*, April 7, 1960, pp. 1, 4.

In his report, al-Rimawi details Jordanian attempts to do away with the Palestinian fighters and facilitate annexation while discussing his role in attempts to strengthen the position of the Arab Higher Committee as a representative of the Palestinians. Al-Rimawi claims to have failed because of others who made arrangements that prevented him from establishing the Committee as the sovereign authority in Palestine or even from retaining some cells for future action – cells which might have allowed it to retain some freedom of action and would eventually have served as the core of the "anticipated liberation," as he puts it.⁽⁵⁸⁾

The first thing that al-Rimawi evidenced in the text of his report was that with the entry of the Jordanian army, orders were issued for its forces to withdraw from the Bab al-Wad area, indicating the beginning of restrictions on HWA military action.⁽⁵⁹⁾

Al-Rimawi detailed his efforts to benefit from the presence of Iraqi forces in order to bypass the Jordanian restrictions. He held a meeting with the Ramallah notables, in which he announced compulsory conscription, once the Iraqi force was stationed in Deir Nidham village, in preparation for the formation of a permanent military force, to reinforce the regular HWA in Birzeit. The aim was to prepare for the liberation of the al-Lidd and Ramleh areas in cooperation with the Iraqi forces. This did not happen because the General Command in Zarqa, under the influence of King Abdullah, prevented the attack, according to al-Rimawi. Instead, it had to content itself with defending the area along thirty-five kilometers, in the heights between the villages of Beit Nabala and Kafr Qasim.⁽⁶⁰⁾

The second point of tension between the Jordanian army and al-Rimawi's HWA was the purchase of weapons from the local population. Al-Rimawi

claims that after the Arab Legion had played its part in the "conspiracy" to abandon al-Lidd, Ramleh and the coastal region and drive out its people, its commander Glubb Pasha took advantage of the impoverished refugees by sending out Bedouin soldiers to buy up their weapons at cut-price rates.⁽⁶¹⁾ (This accusation is a dubious one, with very little detail provided – the local fighters had already been thrown into disarray by the death of Hassan Salama and the Committee's failure to replace him, and local notables had previously seized much of the weaponry and supplies).

In this context, al-Rimawi referred to orders issued from Cairo, the headquarters of the Arab Higher Committee at the time, after he communicated the necessity of combating the sale of weapons.⁽⁶²⁾ It appears from what al-Rimawi wrote that he was aware of the danger the matter posed to the strength of the Palestinian fighters. As al-Rimawi maintained in all of his writings, the main force of the HWA was not the regular force, but rather the "*faz 'āt*" fighters who answer battle calls at every need. They were armed with the local weapons that Glubb was buying up.

Al-Rimawi documented his attempts to confront the policy of buying local weapons, work that did not receive support from the HWA General Command HQ in Jerusalem. The leadership, according to al-Rimawi, was so strong that, had it taken decisive steps, it would have been able to control the situation and exploit the ignorance and lack of personal competencies of Jordanian leaders in the region to their own advantage.⁽⁶³⁾

Describing his efforts, al-Rimawi demonstrated that his plan was based on spreading units from his force around the Ramallah villages of Ni'lin, Rantis, Birzeit and Deir 'Ammar, and ordering them to arrest anyone who

58 Rimawi, "Taqrīr," p. 1.

59 Ibid., p. 17

60 Al-Rimawi used only the name Abdullah, without the title of "king," in his early texts, and, especially in his report, he used the name Abdullah in an abstract form most of the time, only occasionally adding the title "King." This differs from al-Rimawi's later texts, in which he spoke of "the late King Abdullah," or "His Majesty King Abdullah."

61 Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," pp. 17-18. An attempt to liberate al-Lidd, Ramleh and its surroundings, was singled out by al-Rimawi to detail the efforts of a Palestinian military action against the successive Zionist attacks. Other primary sources correspond to al-Rimawi's account. See: Gershon Rivlin & Elhanan Oren, *The War of Independence: Ben-Gurion's Diary*, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), p. 762 [Hebrew]; Zakī Ḥassan Al-Maṣrī, *Ḥadīth Al-Dhikrīyyāt Fuṣṣl wa tarjama Dhātīyya Mundhū 'ām 36-1994* (Ramallah: [special publication], 1994), pp. 37-38.

62 Ibid., p. 18.

63 Ibid.

sells or buys weapons. He also sent a letter to Ahmad Sidqi Bey Al-Jundi (1899-1979), the commander of the Fourth Brigade, who had taken up residence in Ramallah, informing him of the consequences of disarming the Palestinian people by sending weapons abroad contrary to general Arab policy.⁽⁶⁴⁾

According to al-Rimawi, patrol officers began rounding up the Bedouins and the indigenous arms dealers, sending them to a prison in Birzeit, where they were subjected to punishment, flogging, and fines. Al-Rimawi also evidenced that they killed the head of the arms dealing movement, burying his body at the Iraqi army headquarters, but he does not provide any details about his person. It was also documented that police teams stormed the Jordanian army command centre in the region to arrest some of the authorized army dealers.⁽⁶⁵⁾

Killing the head of the arms dealerships represented an entry point to object to the administrative role that the Jordanian army began to play in the areas under its control. According to al-Rimawi, the Ramallah police chief appointed by the Jordanian authorities, Mahmoud Habbab, was accompanied by an Iraqi army commander to Birzeit to investigate the case. Al-Rimawi threw him out and informed him that they did not recognize the administrative authority he represented. He told them that they were not a legitimate government in the country and that their responsibility, as an army, was limited to the conduct of the war.⁽⁶⁶⁾

After Habbab's failure, royal interest, according to al-Rimawi, turned towards the military governor, Bahjat Tabbara, appointed on 18 May 1948 for the Ramallah region, to halt HWA pursuits. Tabbara thus headed to the headquarters of the National

Committee, where al-Rimawi was having a meeting to discuss defence of the region. Al-Rimawi refused to shake hands with him, despite their previous acquaintance. Al-Rimawi explained to Tabbara that he did not recognise him as governor of the region. He noted that Tabbara was interested in meeting him, but al-Rimawi refused and instead sent Musa Shaiban al-Yabroudi (1911-1956), one of the HWA leaders in his place. Tabbara told him that there was an order to arrest al-Rimawi and dissolve the HWA, but that Tabbara had refused to do so, praising their work and popularity, and the strength of their resistance. He threatened to resign if his opinion was not taken on board, later proving true to that threat.⁽⁶⁷⁾

The conflict over the administrative role of the Jordanian army, and local figures appointed by the Jordanian authorities, was central to Jordanian policy during the confrontation with the HWA in Birzeit. After Bahjat Tabbara's resignation, al-Rimawi describes a new dispute with the assistant military governor of the Ramallah district, Azmi Al-Nashashibi (appointed on 27 May 1948). Nashashibi had summoned the clerk for the receipts for the fines issued by HWA in Birzeit, and informed him of his reluctance to take fees and issue official receipts, as this would indicate the presence of two governing authorities in the country. Al-Rimawi responded that "If you have honour as a Palestinian, you must remove these crowns and the stars, and join the leadership of the HWA."⁽⁶⁸⁾

According to al-Rimawi, Nashashibi retired from the military and devoted himself to supervising the radio because he was convinced that his mission had failed.⁽⁶⁹⁾ But the dispute continued with Aref al-Aref, mayor of the region when the British colonisers departed. Aref tried, according to al-Rimawi, to implement King Abdullah's wishes, by sending tax

64 Ibid., p.19.

65 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

66 Ibid., p. 20.

67 Ibid., pp. 20-21

68 Ibid., p. 21

69 Ibid. The Official Gazette published King Abdullah's decision to terminate Nashashibi's service as an assistant to the military governor in Ramallah. See: *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 967 (01/01/1949), p. 2. Prime Minister Tawfik Abu Al-Huda's letter, on 27 November 1948, to the Chief of the Royal Court, provides some context for this decision. In his letter, Abu al-Huda points out that there is no need to keep the status of the assistant military governor in Ramallah as it was, especially in light of the permanent absence of al-Nashashibi from his workplace, as Abu al-Huda quotes from the general military governor, see: Muhammad Adnan al-Bakhit (supervisor), *al-Wathā'iq al-Hāshimīyya: 'Awrāq 'Abdullah bin al-Ḥussayn, al-Idāra al-'Urdunīyya fī filasṭīn 1948-1951*, vol. 6 (Amman: Center for Documents, Manuscripts and Studies in the Levant - University of Jordan, 1995), p. 78. This document suggests that there is a dispute between the military ruler General Omar Matar and al-Nashashibi.

collectors to the villages, seeking to benefit from his previous administrative activity for the Jordanians in implementing their government projects. Al-Rimawi expelled the collectors, declaring that residents should not pay a penny to the illegitimate government of Transjordan, which had no right to collect taxes.⁽⁷⁰⁾

Al-Rimawi also wrote that he had sent an armed force to Aref's house to warn him to stop helping the Jordanians and to shelve the tax collection project. He threatened that if Aref and his aides asked the people to pledge allegiance to King Abdullah, he would be shot.⁽⁷¹⁾

Al-Rimawi wrote that on the following day, a National Committee meeting was held with all the key members of the HWA in Jerusalem, at the invitation of al-Rimawi, as well as Aref. Aref spoke at the meeting about his patriotism without any objection from the audience. But al-Rimawi, according to his report, accused Aref of betraying his homeland and his country, because of his work with the Jordanians to establish their control, and that he collected taxes for them, while also not helping al-Rimawi to maintain internal security, defend the region, or supply fighters. Al-Rimawi accused Aref of exploiting supply licenses to conduct trade and pay off some elites and businessmen. According to al-Rimawi, Aref left directly to meet King Abdullah to inform him that there was no way a Jordanian-appointed governor would be able to meet with

al-Rimawi and the HWA in Birzeit. When the king requested his arrest and the dissolution of the HWA, Aref said he would not be able to execute the task due to its impossibility and the danger it posed to his person.⁽⁷²⁾

Al-Rimawi and HWA in Birzeit continued to obstruct the administrative presence of the Jordanian army in his area of influence, forcing it to resort to using local public opinion, which Jordanian administrators, such as Aref had previously sought to make use of. Al-Rimawi circulated a petition addressed to the political committee of the League of Arab States, the Higher Arab Committee, and the Iraqi Minister of Defence, signed by all the notables, mukhtars and members of the National Committee in the Ramallah area, denouncing the Jordanian attempt to establish an administrative authority in the country, and the readiness of the signatories to resist it. Other petitions were also sent from Nablus, Jenin and Tulkaram to the Arab Higher Committee.⁽⁷³⁾ When the decision was taken to hold a meeting in Gaza on 1 October 1948, notables were invited to attend the meeting in defiance of the Jordanians, and al-Rimawi went to Gaza, despite the Jordanians blocking the road with an armoured car.⁽⁷⁴⁾

The Jericho Conference was held on 1 December 1948 to implement the Jordanian political decision and the leadership of the Arab Higher Committee gave

70 Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," pp. 21-22.

71 Ibid., p. 22

72 Ibid. It is noteworthy that al-Rimawi does not just attack al-Aref's political position at the time, but in his later texts he offers a critique of al-Aref as a historian of war, and there is no reference in the published texts of al-Aref to his role at this stage. His book on the Nakba is limited to a passing reference to chasing *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas*' forces and the residents' position on that: Aref Al-Aref, *al-Nakba: Nakbat Bayt al-Maqdis wal-firdaws al-mafqud*

1947-1949, *al-Juzu' al-Thani, min bud' al-Hudna al-ula 6/11/1948 ila ittifaqiyyat al-Hudna al-Da'ima bayn al-Dūwal al-'Arabīyya wa Isrā'īl -Shubbāṭ/Fibrāyir -Tammūz/Yūnīyū 1949* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2012), p. 278.

73 Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," p. 23.

74 Ibid. The conference was held in Gaza following the All-Palestine Government's decision to call for the formation of a Palestinian national conference. The government and the conference, and then its decisions, provoked Jordanian objections. Sakhnin transmits the texts of telegrams sent to the Gaza conference, the origins of which were preserved in the archives of the Research Center, including a telegram sent from Jerusalem on 26 September 1948, signed by Kassim's brother Adib al-Rimawi, Yaḳoub al-Hussayni, Zaki Abd al-Rahim, Abd al-Rahman Kamel Erekat and Shehadeh Hassouna, the text of which states: "We were prevented by the Jordanian authorities from coming to Gaza. We support you and the members of your government." Kamel Erekat sent a telegram on the same day stating: "It was understood from reliable sources that every person who goes [to] the Gaza meeting will be placed in detention upon his return and will not be permitted to return to his town by the Jordanian authorities." Sakhnin, "Ḍamm Filasṭīn," p. 59. It seems that the Gaza conference served as a motive to hasten the Jordanian government's decision to dissolve *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas*. On 3 October, the Jordanian Minister of Defense issued an order to the Chief of Staff that he should work to address all irregular armed men, and that they submit to the orders of the army, or be dispersed and disarmed: Sulaymān al-Mūsa, *'Āyām La Tunsā: al-'Urdun fī Ḥarb 1948* (Amman: The Royal Court, 2008), p. 490; Also consider: John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1957), pp. 192-193. The Jordanians held a parallel conference in Amman to cast doubt on the representation of the Gaza conference to the people of Palestine. See: Sakhnin, "Ḍamm Filasṭīn," pp. 59-60; 'Ajāj Nuwayhid, *Mudhakirāt of 'Ajāj Nuwayhid, Sittūn 'Āman Ma' al-Qāfila al-'Arabīyya*, Bayān Nuwayhid al-Ḥūt (prep.) (Beirut: Dār al-Istiqlāl for Research and Publishing, 1993), pp. 318-324; For more on the All-Palestine Government, see: Samīh Shabīb, *Ḥakūma 'Umūm Filasṭīn Muqaddimāt wa Natā'ij* (Nicosia: Sharq Press, 1988), pp. 35-57; Avi Shlaim, "The Rise and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Autumn 1990), pp. 37-53.

instructions to thwart the efforts of the two conferees. After the Jerusalem Command headquarters refused to intervene as military personnel who do not interfere in politics, al-Rimawi printed a thousand leaflets to be distributed to the two conferences, explaining the reality of the conference and the intentions of the Jordanians and the English. He had held a meeting in the Dunya cinema hall in Ramallah for all the notables and refugees of the region, in order to take decisions to be recited at the Jericho conference, in the name of the Ramallah region and the refugees, to cut the line of recourse against those whom al-Rimawi called "the men for hire" who would support the conference in Jericho, and to ensure that the decisions issued by the Jericho conference were formulated in a manner that suits the national covenant.

Al-Rimawi is quite explicit about his attempts to engineer attendance in such a way that only loyal people – and not "men for hire" – would be at Ramallah. He summoned approximately two hundred men from loyalist villages to occupy the seats in the Jericho Conference, but they clashed with the occupation of the seats by the followers of Muhammad Ali Ja'abari (1900-1980), the mayor of Hebron, and the most prominent figure in support of Jordanian influence in Palestine. However, al-Rimawi's supporters accosted Ja'abari and Ajaj, and the conference failed to come up with certain decisions.⁽⁷⁵⁾

The failure of the Jericho Conference, according to al-Rimawi, prompted the military governor-general Omar Suleiman Matar (1889-1971)⁽⁷⁶⁾ to call for a second conference attended by King Abdullah in Ramallah, on 26 December 1948. Thus, al-Rimawi brought three cargo cars of his relatives, accompanied by his brother, Adeb al-Rimawi, prior to the conference, to lead a huge demonstration that chanted in support of Haj Amin Al-Husseini and called for the

fall of King Abdullah.⁽⁷⁷⁾ In addition to the protest, al-Rimawi provided details of a truce between the leadership of the HWA force in Jerusalem and the king. In addition to personal impulses, he believed this position a reason to exacerbate King Abdullah's anger at the strength of HWA in the Birzeit region.

Al-Rimawi wrote, attacking King Abdullah: "Imagine what discontent will befall him when he sees the leaders of HWA in Jerusalem as slaves in his hands, and sees the fragmentation in Birzeit obstructing his endeavors, insulting his rulers, and imprisoning his men! He is known for his meanness and love of revenge! It makes matters worse that the meeting that took place in Nablus after a while, was targeted by a bomb that was said to be part of the HWA."⁽⁷⁸⁾

Al-Rimawi's efforts to obstruct the Jordanian administrative role, as well as the political activity that paved the way for "annexation," would not succeed, despite going beyond soft power and consolidating the relationship with the Iraqi forces. At times, al-Rimawi used military force against the Jordanians, as well as against some Palestinians, as mentioned earlier. After al-Rimawi went to the Gaza conference, the Commander Musa Shaiban was arrested, by order of the military governor-general, Omar Matar, and Matar issued an order to arrest al-Rimawi. Then a force led by the Chief of Staff of the First Division, Sadiq al-Shara (1923-2009), accompanied by the commander of the second battalion, Fawaz Maher Barammat (1924-1997),⁽⁷⁹⁾ headed to the headquarters of the HWA Command in Birzeit, trying at first to control the wireless communication device. Al-Rimawi gave orders to besiege and detain the Jordanian force, and forcefully moved a car in the direction of Ramallah, storming the headquarters of the military governor, Nadim al-Samman, to get Commander Musa Shaiban out of prison.⁽⁸⁰⁾ Al-Rimawi also wrote that his forces had arrested several murder

75 Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," pp. 29-30. For more on the Jericho conference and the King's attempt to exploit it to silence *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas*, see: Tal, pp. 374-379. Compare with: Nūwayhid, pp. 318-324.

76 Matar was appointed on 26 September 1948 as "General Military Governor of all the areas in Palestine in which the Jordanian Arab Legion is located or maintains security and order." See: *Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, No. 959 (18/10/1948), p. 301; al-Bakhit, p. 75.

77 Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," p. 30.

78 Most likely, the intended meeting was the one that took place in Nablus on 28 December 1948: The decisions of the conference are found in: "Muqararāt al-Mu'tamar al-Sha'abi al-Muna'qid fi Nāblus, Isti'nāf al-Qitāl, Tajnīd al-Filasṭīniyyīn, Mubāya'a Jalāla Malik 'Abdullah," *Al-Ba'ath*, 29/12/1948, p. 4.

79 He was a commander of the Second Company in the Sixth Battalion, with a leadership rank. Most of the companies of the Sixth Battalion entered Jerusalem, but the second company was transferred to Ramallah on 27 May 1948, see: Tal, pp. 30, 121. He was promoted to deputy leader on 24 August 1948.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

suspects that the Jordanian run police had failed to arrest, and referred them to the Iraqi military court, refusing to hand them over to the Jordanian police in Ramallah. He sent with them a letter referring to the shortcomings of the Jordanian administration, its inability to govern, and the ensuing chaos.⁽⁸¹⁾

After this conflict, the Jordanians seemed to prefer a soft entry into the Birzeit headquarters of *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas*, so the military governor of Ramallah, Nadim al-Samman, came to the headquarter expressing his willingness to grant al-Rimawi all the facilities and assistance he wanted. Al-Rimawi points out that Samman relayed a message to him from the military governor-general, Omar Matar, talking about Matar's desire to meet with al-Rimawi. Al-Rimawi's response was the same as before:

And what does he want? If he wants to fight the Jews, then we're well ahead of him. If he wants [to buy us], then we will not be bought, no matter how much he's offering. We will not bother him, so long as he makes no attacks on us. We cannot endorse any authority other than the All-Palestine government. If he wants to discuss these matters with me, he should go to Birzeit. Militarily, I am cooperating with the Iraqi army. Administratively, I have official authority from the All-Palestine Government to carry out my business.⁽⁸²⁾

The meeting ended, according to al-Rimawi, with Samman offering to send a police detachment under al-Rimawi's command, to collect the fees for the HWA as an alternative to the apparent dual authority, but al-Rimawi refused. Subsequently, according

al-Rimawi's notes, an order was issued for a Jordanian army unit, led by Fawaz Maher to enter. Maher made contact with the HWA Command in Jerusalem and al-Rimawi on 19 October 1948 and his forces occupied a house in Birzeit after al-Rimawi refused to hand over one of the HWA buildings, based on an order from the General Command in Jerusalem. Al-Rimawi confirmed that Maher told him that he "does not want a single drop of blood to be shed, because he is a Muslim above all." Al-Rimawi documented that the HWA's own strength was reduced on the same night, after a company of one hundred soldiers was sent to the Bethlehem area to help confront the Zionist attacks, and recapture Al-Walaja, Battir and Husan.⁽⁸³⁾

Jordan's supporters took advantage of Maher's strength, and were prompted to increase their activity and begin to organize petitions of allegiance to him. The military rulers also bribed dignitaries and merchants, according to al-Rimawi, by granting them import licenses for supplies and kerosene.⁽⁸⁴⁾ The relationship remained calm between the two parties, until Jordan decided to put an end to the presence of the HWA in Birzeit on 18 January 1948, after it succeeded in besieging the General Command in Jerusalem, as well as the HWA headquarters in Bethlehem before that,⁽⁸⁵⁾ taking advantage of an incident in which the house of Ramallah police chief Mahmoud Al-Habab was blown up.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Al-Rimawi appears to have been unable to resist the large Jordanian force that was assigned to occupy Birzeit, given the inability of the HWA headquarter in Jerusalem to support it, and that the Iraqi army command advised him to move his

81 Ibid., p. 32.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., p. 33.

84 Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," p. 34.

85 In his text, al-Rimawi refers to measures to restrict the power of *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas* in the Jerusalem area, but it appears that the position of the Jerusalem leadership, which al-Rimawi considered pacifist, was based on a good relationship with the leadership of the Jordanian forces in Jerusalem, and its first military governor, Abdullah Tal, who spoke of this relationship categorical refusal to end *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas* and his in his memoirs: Tal, pp. 103, 107, 239, 359-366. In the Bethlehem region, where an *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas* force was reinforced at different times to support the Egyptian army, the Jordanian army began to consolidate their influence in the region, on 7 November 1948, taking advantage of the Egyptian forces' need following the Zionist Yoav operation against them in southern Palestine. A few days later, on 11 November, a Jordanian force surrounded the Bethlehem police station and seized all the radio communication equipment in the station, including the *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas* Force's communication device. For this operation, see: Muḥammad Ḥassanayn Haykal, *al-'Arūsh and al-Jayūsh (2) 'Azmat al-'Urūsh, Ṣadmat al-Juyūsh, Qirā'a Mutāaṣṣila fī Yawmīyyāt al-Harb (Palestine 1948)*, al-'A' mā al-Kāmila la-Muḥammad Ḥassanayn Haykal (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouk Publishing and Distribution, 2009), p. 302; Tal, pp. 361-365. For *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas* in the Bethlehem region, see: Ameen Abū al-Sha'ar, *Mujāhid min Abu Dāis* (Amman: [n.p.], 1975), pp. 196-198; Abu Gharbīya, *Mudhakirāt al-Munāḍil*, pp. 350-374.

86 Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," p. 34. Tal provided an account of a meeting led by Glubb Pasha, to discuss the royal recommendations for the necessity of eliminating and erasing the name of *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas* from existence following the Habbab incident. See: Tal, pp. 365-366. Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," p. 34.

forces' headquarters to the town of Aboud, where an HWA force base was sponsored by Iraq.⁽⁸⁷⁾

The decision of the Higher Arab Committee to reject al-Rimawi's proposal to increase its strength in order to take control over open armed resistance in the country, or to allow the work of secret formations, and join the Iraqi army heralded the downfall of Birzeit's HWA forces and its leader, Qasim al-Rimawi, as well as the decline of their role overall.⁽⁸⁸⁾ Once they had occupied the Birzeit headquarters, one of the central forces of the HWA was finished, leaving the path wide open for the Jordanian forces to dismantle the rest of their areas of influence and take control of all its centres of power.

These early writings of al-Rimawi provide clear evidence of his attitude towards the Jordanian military and its administration of the lands it controlled after 15 May 1948. They show that what he wrote in his later texts regarding the "annexation" or "unified government," was not an inevitable path produced by the field unit during the battles, nor was it by desire or choice. However, the transformations taking place in al-Rimawi's career, from the fighter to the politician, not only pushed him to accept and acknowledge the fait accompli, despite his initial absolute rejection, but also pushed him to silence a major part of his history and experience after 15 May 1948.

When al-Rimawi's later texts mentioned some of the incidents he had written about in the early texts, such as the cooperation with the Iraqi forces, to liberate the area of al-Lidd and Ramleh after its occupation, they silenced any reference to the negative role of Jordan or the king. In his later texts, al-Rimawi limited himself to stating that the main reason for ceasing the operation was the arrival of a vague telegram

from Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmoud al-Mahdi, stating that the General Command knew the intention of the attack, and ordered them to wait and not to make any moves.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Al-Rimawi did a U-turn on his presentation of the role of the Jordanian forces in defending the area of al-Lidd and Ramleh, which he had silenced in earlier texts, opposing the accusations he had made against these forces. He commented on a conversation about the supposed operation of al-Lidd and Ramleh by saying: "[Here], I must, in fairness, allude to the fact that a company from the Jordanian Arab Legion, which was stationed in that area, had previously carried out, in cooperation with the local militants, a counter-attack against the enemy forces, whereby they occupied these two villages [Qula and Al-Muzayri'a], and remained there for about three days, then withdrew to Jerusalem area. In fact, keeping these two villages did not have any military significance."⁽⁹⁰⁾

Although al-Rimawi's later texts revise the roles of many Palestinian personalities and organizations that he presented in his early texts as part of the conflicting historical narratives of the HWA, what stands out in his later writings about the end of the HWA is that he silenced his differences with the leadership in Jerusalem over their policy towards Jordanian action. Al-Rimawi, as was indicated previously, made many references to the negative role and these pacifists towards Jordan in his early writings. Among the personalities that al-Rimawi harshly criticized was Musa Al-Husseini.

But al-Rimawi's silencing of the entire dispute over "annexation" is apparently reinforced by his awareness of the haste of his judgments, in his early texts, about the relationship of HWA Command in Jerusalem with Jordan, especially after the assassination of the

87 Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," p. 35. Sulaymān al-Mūsa, trying to explain the reasons for the dissolution of *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas*, quotes the testimony of a Jordanian officer: "The Arab Legion, with Glubb over its head, helped [in] arming the militants in Palestine from the start of the fighting in late 1947. It continued until after the second ceasefire, when a political development on this issue occurred, and the government, not Glubb, decided to disarm all the militants, and include whoever wished to the regular forces." Al-Mūsa, p. 490. Various sources confirm that the decision to dissolve *al-Jihād al-Muqaddas*, was also both a royal and a government desire, not limited to Glubb. They also confirm that the decision to dissolve was taken since the beginning of the Jordanian Arab Legion's entry into Palestine after 15 May, and that the reason for delaying it was related to the facts on the ground.

88 Al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr," p. 36.

89 Al-Rimawi, "ba'd Kitāb Yā Quds," p. 4.

90 *Ibid.*, p. 4. The battle of Qula 15-18 July 1948 indicates exceptional fighting on the sidelines of the battle of al-Lidd and Ramleh, but this battle was silenced to push a historical narrative condemning the Jordanian army and its military and political leadership and accusing it of treason, in addition the accusations related to al-Lidd and Ramleh, see: Tal, pp. 247-262; Al-Arif, vol. 2, pp. 56-60. On the battles of Qula, which resulted in the large losses of the Zionist forces, an official Zionist account is found in: Gershon Rivlin & Sinai Tsevi (eds.), *Alexandroni Brigade in the War of Independence* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot Publishing, 1964) pp. 291-296 [Hebrew].

leader of the HWA, Khaled al-Husseini, on 2 March 1951 – and likewise, after Musa Al-Husseini was accused of being fully responsible for carrying out

the assassination of King Abdullah bin Al-Husseini, on 20 July 1951.

Conclusion: What Next?

An essential part of the history of the 1947-1949 war, and especially the experience of Palestinian fighters, has been silenced in the various historical sources, in view of the political transformations that followed the defeat, the most prominent of which was the displacement of Palestinian fighters and their leadership to different Arab countries, with some of them acknowledging their new fait accompli. The later al-Rimawi texts are an example of such silencing. Therefore, when chronicling the history of the war, and especially the so-called unification of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and what was left of Palestine after 15 May 1948, the prevailing historical narratives are less than reliable given that many are based on silencing other narratives.

Likewise, when chronicling the role of Palestinian military action in the 1947-1949 war, the subsequent Palestinian resistance, Palestinian displacement and the faded hopes of establishing an independent political entity, it is necessary to dig deeper than the prevailing historical narratives related to the impact of the Jordanian role after 15 May 1948. For a more

in-depth reading, research into early Palestinian resistance must transcend the Jordanian role, which has silenced many details, to search for other narratives that explain the limits of the Palestinians' role in that historical moment. This also entails understanding the limits of the inter-Palestinian disputes and differences between the political elites or the fighters themselves on the silenced Jordanian role, and its impact on the fate of their land.

In conclusion, a comparison between Qasim al-Rimawi's early and late texts reflects this act of silencing and, in contrast, documenting at times. They can be considered a model for the texts of the defeated based on memory, which read the event with the eye of the present. This reading changes with the evolution of alliances or various political and social developments. Thus, efforts must be made to collect all texts related to it, especially if it is a central and institutional event, such as the 1947-1949 war, in which the different parties struggle to prove their narratives about it. For this reason, all of al-Rimawi's texts must be preserved and considered.

Appendix

The first page of the manuscript report submitted by Qasim al-Rimawi to Haj Amin Al-Husseini, 1948

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

أقمت أدناه تقريراً عن الاحتمالات التي تمت أثناء قيام معركة فلسطين خاضها بالذکر موقف قيادة الجهاد المقدس من بعد استشهاد المرحوم عبد القادر الحسيني وكيف طالت الترتيبات التي اتبعتها بين وبين قيام سيادة مطلقه للهيئة العربية العليا من فلسطين مع الأقل الاقواء مع بعض الخدابات التي شكلوه سلفاً في يد الهيئة ترتكز على الاحتمال المقبلة لتبوءه نواة التحرير المستود:

٢- مقدمة : عندما اعلنت الجهاد وبدأت الاستجابات بين العرب واليهود مرة فتره مميزة قبل دخول عبد القادر الحسيني البلاد فانت جميع القرى والبلدات فيها مفتوحة امام العدوان الصهيوني فاجتاحت مدينة القدس خفقت اجساماً في بئرزيه حضره جميع مسلمي قطاع ورام الله وبلغ الحضور حوالي خمسين رجلاً فانه منهم حوالي ثلاثمائة مسلح واقصدت مع اللجنة بالقيادة في القدس وطلبه ارسال وفد منهم لاستطلاع الاوضاع التطوعية للدفاع عن مدينة القدس والقمض حضر الاستاذ اميل العنود وسامح الحسيني واخذوا مع مسلماً وزعمهم مع الامم العربية العربية فتولوا الدفاع عن المدينة بحسن مله هذه المدة ومانوا الخلية الاولى التي تولت الدفاع عن المدينة تحفظهم استشهدوا والبعض الآخر لفر كنوانه للدفاع من اتبع نظام الدفاع حضر - القائد عبد القادر - فانه المذكور هذه هم النواة التي ارتكز عليها في تنظيم الدفاع عن جميع اجزاء المدينة بالقدس واحتفظت انا لقوات كبيرة من المسلمين افدت الجوف في القوي للدموعه في حمل السلاح والمالكة بجانب مدينة القدس لتجديده انه قام اليهود باجوم كبير على - وفي هذه الاثناء تولت ذهبت الامم حيث في نقلت بعض الاستعمارية التي تسمى اللجنة العسكرية العليا من محضلات منطقة القدس خالد صنع الاولى مرتين في حربه طردياً محترقاً بالناظر والمستعرات اليهودية وماء بالبقولة والمستعرات الاخرى لانها منسبة الى اعني فتم تيرة الحرس اليهودي طلبه اللوليه - وكذلك النقلة الثانية واي الثالثة فقد طلبوا انه امر في حشر شرق الاردن لمحو تجنياً للخطر اليهودي ومانت هذه المرة الاولى التي نقلت منها السلاح الى سوريا الا فطلبه حشر شرق الاردن فنتقلنا ولكننا بصيرة متفانية وبما عمدت فيه الامم فاني فانت هذه ان ستمت

Source: Qasim al-Rimawi, "Taqrīr Makhtūṭ Muqaddim ila Ḥajj Amin al-Ḥusayni," dated 1949, archived in Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Palestinian National Movement Project Archives, p. 1.

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