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# The Constant and the Variable in the Attitudes of Moroccan Islamists towards the Civil State<sup>(1)</sup>

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This study examines the attitudes of Morocco's two main Islamist parties towards the modern civil state, and the extent to which members of the Justice and Charity Movement and the Justice and Development Party are willing to change their attitudes towards the notion of the civil state. The findings reveal that both movements concur in their categorical rejection of a ruler being non-Muslim and in their affirmation of the importance of political participation in the context of an Islamic system of government, which is understood as being synonymous with shura (consultation). Notable differences are detected, however, with the Justice and Development Party deemed more receptive to partial secularism and to the election of government officials. The change in attitudes for the sample as a whole reveals a rise in the number of positive attitudes towards secularism and a drop in those concerned with its twin, democracy, as well as a marginal decline in the number of positive attitudes towards party pluralism and the election of government officials.

Islamist Parties Morocco Civil State Justice and Charity Movement Justice and Development Party

## Introduction

It goes without saying that the Arab Spring exceeded everyone's expectations. The rise of Islamists to power was an unprecedented surprise, delightful to some and a source of anxiety to others, as reflected in this title of Le Monde's article: '*Over the embers of the "Arab Spring": The Islamists' test of power*'<sup>(3)</sup>. The Arab Spring placed the Islamists themselves face to face with the test of power and all its complexities. The pressing question they face today is whether such power has further consolidated their dream of building a state according to the Prophetic agenda and that of the Caliphs. Or, has their experience with direct governance rendered their vision of governance more prone to negotiation and their stance regarding the civil state more flexible?

The aim of this study is not to provide direct and radical answers to these questions. Instead, it intends to explore several factors that would help concerned parties, specialists and decision-makers open a political and intellectual dialogue regarding this issue.

The study uses Moscovici's theory of social representations to explain those positions and beliefs commonly shared by members of a group, constituting their collective<sup>(4)</sup> or shared memory<sup>(5)</sup>. The study explores the stance of Moroccan Islamists – specifically the 'Justice and Charity Movement' (JCM) and the 'Justice and Development Party' (JDP) – regarding the civil state. It differentiates between what can be negotiated and reconsidered versus what

1 This study was originally published in Issue 3/10, Fall 2014 of Omran.

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3 Alain Gresh, "Sur les braises du « printemps arabe »: Les Islamistes à l'épreuve du pouvoir" *Le Monde diplomatique* (November 2012), pp. 1 and 20-21.

4 Serge Moscovici, "Communication introductive à la première conférence internationale sur les représentations sociales," (papier présentée à: La 1ère Conférence internationale sur les représentations sociales, Ravello, Italie, 1992).

5 Joël Candau, *Anthropologie de la mémoire*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005), p. 3.

is unchangeable, as well as determines which of the two movements has more negotiable positions<sup>(6)</sup>.

Based on the above, the following research questions were formulated: To what extent is the impact of ideological difference between the JCM and the JDP influential on the positions of their members regarding a civil state? In other words, to what extent can we ascertain the existence of a significant difference between the positions of members of both movements regarding the civil state? And to what extent are members of both movements willing to

show attitude change<sup>(7)</sup> when faced with cognitively dissonant situations (CDS) that include argumentative and evidence-based counter-attitudes<sup>(8)</sup>? Would they remain, after the induction of the cognitive dissonance, loyal to their original positions, or would they drift toward a more open position regarding the civil state in its contemporary and secular meaning? Or would they resort to an integrated position that combines both Islamic and modern secular understanding of the state, in order to reduce the level of cognitive dissonance thus experienced<sup>(9)</sup>?

## Theoretical Background

This section presents a number of key studies that have attempted to answer the following central questions: Can the nature of an individual's political affiliation be predicted based on their political stances regarding an issue? In other words, is it possible to know an individual's political position from the party or group one belongs to, or does one alter their positions or accommodate them as a function of the different dictates of the context, regardless of one's political affiliation?

### *The Hypothesis that Political Affiliation Matches Personal Political Attitudes*

Several field studies have concluded that political affiliations match the political attitudes of the party members; for instance, in a study by Cohen<sup>(10)</sup>, a generous healthcare plan proposal was presented to a group of Republicans, and a more austere, stringent version was presented to a group of Democrats.

Surprisingly, the Republican voters supported the Republican healthcare plan despite the discordance of its contents with their political viewpoints, with the same happening for the Democrat voters.

Within the same vein, Carney et. al.<sup>(11)</sup> reached the conclusion that the nature of political belonging does not only affect individuals' attitudes, but also their personalities. For instance, liberals are more open to new experiences and more willing to negotiate than conservatives. They are also less beholden to traditions, less resistant to change<sup>(12)</sup>, and more tolerant of individuals from different socio-economic classes (the working-class), ethnicities (Indians and Hispanics) and religions (Muslims and Jews), than conservatives<sup>(13)</sup>.

Jost's study<sup>(14)</sup> is the most substantial study on this topic. Based on 80 samples comprising 22,818 cases, which spanned twelve countries, the study

6 Jean-Claude Abric, "Central System, Peripheral System: Their Functions and Roles in the dynamics of Social Representations," *Papers on Social Representations*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1993), p. 75.

7 Gregory R. Maio and Geoffrey Haddock, *The Psychology of Attitudes and Attitude Change* (Los Angeles/ London: Sage Publications, 2009), p. 91.

8 Robert J. Rydell and Allen R. McConnell, "Consistency and Inconsistency in Implicit Social Cognition: The Case of Implicit and Explicit Measures of Attitudes," in: Bertram Gawronski and B. Keith Payne, eds., *Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications* (New York: Guilford Press, 2010), p. 300.

9 Martha Augoustinos, Iain Walker and Ngaire Donaghue, *Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction*, 2nd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 128.

10 Geoffrey L. Cohen, "Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 85, no. 5 (2003), p. 809.

11 Dana R. Carney [et al.], "The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things they Leave Behind," *Political Psychology*, vol. 29, no. 6 (December, 2008), p. 807.

12 John T. Jost, Brian A. Nosek and Samuel D. Gosling, "Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology," *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, vol. 3, no. 2 (March 2008), p. 126.

13 Brian A. Nosek, Jesse Graham, and Carlee Beth Hawkins, "Implicit Political Cognition," in: *Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications*, eds. Bertram Gawronski and B. Keith Payne (New York: Guilford Press, 2010), p. 551.

14 John T. Jost et al. "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition," *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 129, no. 3 (2003), p. 339.

delineated the characteristics that differentiate conservative individuals from those with a liberal-reformist orientation, showing that conservatives tend to be more dogmatic, less tolerant of ambiguity, more avoidant of self-doubt in their convictions and beliefs, more attached to their way of living, more willing to defend the traditional social order based on class hierarchies and sexual discrimination, and more afraid of individuals holding different beliefs or customs.

Building on this train of thought and based on ethnographic data<sup>(15)</sup>, could it then be said that the JCM is a Moroccan conservative Islamist political movement, given that it refuses to negotiate with the current political regime and continues to hold on to a vision of Prophetic Islamist governance? It has also stopped supporting the February 20 Movement due to moral rather than political considerations, given that the youth of the February 20 Movement supposedly do not fast in Ramadan, defend LGBT and women's rights, and are predominantly atheists. By the same token, could it be assumed that the JDP represents the liberal Islamist current in Morocco, as it has relations with different governmental organizations, even non-Islamic banking organizations, and has integrated in the official political system by assuming significant governmental posts and establishing a political alliance with a Communist-oriented party?

Employing the above characterization, the hypothesis may be formulated that the JCM (the Conservatives) are more stable in their adherence to their positions regarding the civil state and more resistant to change when faced with a cognitively-dissonant situation

(CDS), as opposed to the JDP (the Liberals). If this hypothesis were true, it may then be argued that the conservative members of the JCM will rigidly adhere to their beliefs when faced with counter-arguments<sup>(16)</sup>, thus blocking all mental effort that would allow them to elucidate complex cognitive strategies to process and assimilate counter-viewpoints, which results in their use of the simple, rudimentary mechanisms they have always resorted to and on which they have been trained<sup>(17)</sup>. This is reflected in the type of dichotomous reasoning which may be translated in formulations such as: 'You are with me, therefore I will listen to you; and if you are not with me, then you have no place in my mental constructs<sup>(18)</sup>', and it reinforces more extremist values and thoughts in conservative groups<sup>(19)</sup>, embarking on a large latitude of rejection for opposing viewpoints<sup>(20)</sup>, regardless of their realism or argumentative strength. Hence, this would explain the lack of commitment from conservative groups to any form of negotiations that seek a middle ground between their views and opposing viewpoints<sup>(21)</sup>.

#### *The Hypothesis that Political Affiliation does not Match Personal Attitudes*

Researchers have tried not to fall for the prototypical narrative of liberals and conservatives. For instance, liberals are not necessarily always ready to revise their political positions or to open up to new experiences that oppose their values and beliefs. Within this vein, Greenberg and Jonas<sup>(22)</sup> have conducted a field study of conservative and liberal political currents in a number of countries in 2003. They concluded that rigidity in political opinion and unwillingness to interact with politics, despite being traditionally seen

15 Abdelhak Jebbar, "Étude Socio-cognitive des croyances politico-religieuses au Maroc," (Thèse de doctorat en cours, Faculté SAIS Fès), et N. Mahmi, "Connaissance d'autrui et attitudes protocentriques dans les mouvements religieux au Maroc: Une Approche d'ethnographie cognitive," (Thèse de doctorat en cours, Faculté SAIS Fès).

16 Philip E. Tetlock, "Psychology and Politics: The Challenges of Integrating Levels of Analysis in Social Science," in: *Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles*, eds. Arie W. Kruglanski and E. Tory Higgins, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), p. 905.

17 This means that individuals are more inclined to analyze a number of issues surrounding them without involving a lot of mental efforts, as they would rather rely on a kind of cognitive parsimony (cognitive misers) based in ready-made answers which they are used to hear from others. See: Richard J. Crisp and Rhiannon N. Turner, *Essential Social Psychology*, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2010), p. 65.

18 Mahmi, "Une Approche d'ethnographie cognitive," p 17.

19 Tetlock, "Psychology and Politics," p. 905

20 Gregory R. Maio and G. Haddock, "Attitude Change," in: *Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles*, eds., Kruglanski and Higgins, p. 571

21 It should be noted that the individual resorts to a method of absolute rejection of a position, when the adoption of new positions affects his community's identity. Hence, he/she wants to prove, through his/her intransigence, his/her loyalty to his/her belonging to the community. See: Augoustinos, Walker and Donaghue, p. 133.

22 Jeff Greenberg and Eva Jonas, "Psychological Motives and Political Orientation -The Left, the Right, and the Rigid: Comment on Jost et al.," *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 129, no. 3 (2003), p. 376.

as characteristic of conservatives, can apply to liberals as well. Tetlock<sup>(23)</sup> found that activists of the Labour Party in Great Britain hold a form of dichotomous reasoning in their dealings with a number of political issues, translated as: ‘You are either with us or against us’, which is not an uncommon attitude among members of the Conservative Party. In their study based on content analysis, both Tetlock and Boettger<sup>(24)</sup> concluded that members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union politburo were less radical and more open on a number of political issues when compared to Gorbachev reformists.

Hence, predicting the attitudes of members of both ‘JCM’ and ‘JDP’ regarding the civil state does not necessarily have to be based on their political affiliation. Instead, the context in which they are placed can influence their attitudes as will be explored below.

### *The Importance of Context in Shaping Individuals’ Political Attitudes*

Context plays a key role in shaping individual political attitudes. Despite belonging to the same individuals, attitudes that are expressed in an experimental context can differ from those expressed in the realistic world<sup>(25)</sup>. Similarly, opinions that are openly expressed on cable TV are not necessarily the same as those expressed in the private company of friends, or the same as those expressed anonymously in internet chat-rooms<sup>(26)</sup>. In other words, an individual may be more cautious when surrounded by people of her own group and abstain from publicly expressing a certain opinion<sup>(27)</sup>. Events that take place within an individual’s environment play a key role in changing people’s attitudes. For instance, an experimental study

by Ferguson *et al.*<sup>(28)</sup>, using the technique of sentence arrangement, has concluded that Americans tend to be more patriotic during times of natural disasters or following terrorist attacks. It is also worth noting that the positions of the leaders of Islamic movements towards the civil state changed following the Arab Spring and after their ascension to political power.

Based on the above, we can assume that an individual’s attitude towards an issue would change as a function of the evolving circumstances around him, becoming either more radical or more flexible. In this context, Tetlock provided examples of conservatives taking more extreme stances when confronted with issues that constitute a red line to them, such as the concept of a welfare state built on social democracy, which is a provocative matter to them. In such contexts, their reactions would shift towards calling for privatization, putting an end to affirmative action, gutting funding for federal agencies, reducing state intervention in the economy, and significantly lowering taxes<sup>(29)</sup>. An example of such an ‘attitudinal regression’<sup>(30)</sup> would be how the terrorist attacks of 9/11 alone accounted for significant changes in political attitudes, where many Americans switched their allegiance from the Democratic to the Republican party within a week of the attacks<sup>(31)</sup>.

Therefore, the question in the context of this study and related to the above is: Would facing members of JCM and JDP with cognitively dissonant situations (CDS) lead to a retraction of their positive attitudes towards the civil state?

23 Philip E. Tetlock, “Cognitive Style and Political Belief Systems in the British House of Commons,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 46, no. 2 (February 1984), p. 365.

24 Philip E. Tetlock and Richard Boettger, “Cognitive and Rhetorical Styles of Traditionalist and Reformist Soviet Politicians: A Content Analysis Study,” *Political Psychology*, vol. 10, no. 2 (June 1989), p. 209.

25 Nosek, Graham and Hawkins, p. 552.

26 Hicham Khabbache, “Empowering Mindreading Skill via Online Social Networks,” in: *Analele Universitații Ovidius. Seria Filologie* (Constanța, Romania: Ovidius University Press, 2012), p. 136.

27 Crisp and Turner, p. 161.

28 Melissa J. Ferguson, Travis J. Carter and Ran R. Hassin, “On the Automaticity of Nationalist Ideology: The Case of the USA,” in: *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, eds., John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, Hulda Thorisdottir, (New York: Guilford Press, 2009), p. 53.

29 Tetlock, “Psychology and Politics,” p. 905.

30 Hicham Khabbache, Joël Candau and Abdelhak Jebbar, “Dilemmes sociocognitifs d’Islamistes marocains confrontés au passage conceptuel de l’état religieux à l’état civil,” *Societal and Political Psychology International Review*, vol. 3, no. 1 (2012), p. 50.

31 George A. Bonanno and John T. Jost, “Conservative Shift Among High-Exposure Survivors of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks,” *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, vol. 28, no. 4 (2006), p. 311.

On the opposite end of attitudinal regression is the concept of attitudinal accessibility<sup>(32)</sup>, described as a type of heuristic thinking where the individual hurriedly adopts a particular position, using and repeating it on several occasions without questioning or discussing it, because it matches one's ideological mindset. This leads us to reflect on the extent to which such attitudes are present in the JCM and JDP's perceptions of the concept of a civil state.

It is therefore important to consider the context of an attitude in its relation to the political domain, in order to better assess the presence of flexible negotiable positions on one hand, and rigid non-negotiable positions on the other hand. The presence or absence of either positions is linked to:

- a) The nature of the issue at stake; for example, Islamists' views on democracy are not the same as their views on secularism.
- b) The 'Attitude Holder', which is the sum of the individual's beliefs and perceptions of the civil state that have been molded within and outside one's affiliation group.
- c) The context or the circumstances; for example, the positions held by Islamists regarding the civil state before their access to power are not the same as those after their ascension to power<sup>(33)</sup>.

Attitude change as a function of the surrounding context and circumstances, and the resulting attitude conflict, whether at the individual or group level, are naturally occurring mental operations. In this respect, the school of psycho-social discourse analysis has addressed sharp criticism to most perspectives in social psychology that aim at ensuring order and coherence onto psycho-social phenomena, including evident contradictory political attitudes, which are, by essence, non-organized. Such perspectives are governed by an arsenal of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, and their role is limited to the tabulation and categorization of data in cells and

charts. Thus, coherence is seemingly perceived in basic contradictions<sup>(34)</sup> within the same topic, as in 'we accept the separation of powers but we do not accept separating religion from the state', or regarding the same person: 'I support Nasrallah's war against Israel but oppose his intervention in Syria', or within the constituent components of a position, as in 'I accept and refuse secularism'<sup>(35)</sup>.

However, holding contradictory opinions being part of our daily lives, our psychological nature makes us strive toward hiding such internal contradictions by projecting a weak self-image. This is evident in some television talk-shows which bring forth two directly opposed guests in a debate. Noticeable in such shows is the extent to which each of the debaters tries to showcase the inherent contradictions of their opponents in an attempt at weakening their image (for example, the show '*Ittijah Mu'akis*' on Al Jazeera).

The discomfort resulting from having contradictory opinions<sup>(36)</sup> necessitates finding strategies to reduce the discomfort, either by refusing the contradictory view altogether, or by seeking to establish a compromise between the two contradictory views by adopting an integrated position<sup>(37)</sup>. This is not any different from what happens to a child when he is informed that the Earth is round. Upon receiving this information for the first time, along with the arguments and evidence confirming the roundness of the earth, the child tries to reconcile between the scientific evidence and their own perception of the earth as a flat surface. The child uses an integrated construct based on the following scenario: 'The Earth is round but there is a part of it which is flat on which we live, which stops us from falling'<sup>(38)</sup>.

Relating the above to the context of our study, it is assumed that Islamists will formulate integrated constructs of the civil state when faced with CDS, translated in a rhetoric of partial secularism or multiparty democracy with an Islamic tinge.

32 Nosek, Graham and Hawkins, p. 553.

33 Maio and Haddock, p. 566.

34 Augoustinos, Walker and Donaghue, p. 141.

35 Maio and Haddock, p. 566.

36 Ian R. Newby-Clark, Ian McGregor and Mark P. Zanna, "Thinking and Caring about Cognitive Inconsistency: When and for Whom Does Attitudinal Ambivalence Feel Uncomfortable?", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol.82, no. 2 (February, 2002), p. 157.

37 Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 7.

38 Stella Vosniadou and William F. Brewer, "Mental Models of the Earth: A Study of Conceptual Change in Childhood," *Cognitive Psychology*, vol. 24 (1992), p. 535.

## Methodology

The sample of the study consists of 100 university students, 50 of whom are active members of the JCM (43 males and 7 females), and 50 of whom are active members in either the Unification or Reform Movement (URM) or the JDP (32 males and 18 females), with an average age of 25 years.

### Methodological Tools

A questionnaire consisting of 8 items was given to each subject, indirectly assessing their stance towards the principles of the civil state through question formulations such as ‘Does the understanding of the state in Islam, for example, consider the principle of separation of powers?’ Once the subject’s stance was assessed, each subject was placed in a cognitively-dissonant situation (CDS) as a function of his/her expressed stance. The CDS includes a counter viewpoint and a couple of justifications based (a) on the Quran and (b) on a logical argument. The subject was then asked to re-state his/her viewpoint and justify it. Two situations can occur in response to CDS: The subject will adhere to his/her original opinion (whether in favor or against the civil state) or will shift his/her opinion in any of the three directions: (1) Shifting from an antagonistic position towards the civil state to a more positive stance; (2) Shifting from a positive position of the civil state to an antagonistic stance; and (3) No shifting after CDS.

Cognitive strategies used by the subjects in response to CDS to formulate their opinion, are categorized as

follows: Negative attitudes regarding the civil state based on total rejection of its principles are coded as “Attitude Against”, while positive opinions regarding the civil state are coded as either “Attitude With” when reflecting full agreement with the principles of the civil state, or “Integrated Attitude” when reflecting partial rejection and partial agreement with the principles of the civil state.

#### *Experimental application (example)*

Item 2: Separation of religion from the state: Does the Islamic state support the separation of religion from the state?

#### *CDS for negative respondents:*

The Prophet (PBUH) stressed on the importance of separating religion from the state when he said to a group of laborers fertilizing palm trees in Medina: “You are more learned in material issues”, as well as in consultations with his followers before the Battle of *Badr*, despite the fact that he was under God’s guidance. How do you explain this?

#### *CDS for positive respondents:*

Some Islamic jurists believe that those who call for a separation of religion and state are actually calling for the removal of religion’s guidance from society and are thus opposed to Islam. This would lead to a blasphemous denial of the role of religion in the management of civil affairs; thus, there is an atheistic agenda to secularism.

|                  |                     |               |
|------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Attitude Against | Integrated Attitude | Attitude With |
|------------------|---------------------|---------------|

### Questionnaire Items

1. Separation of powers: Is the state in Islam based on a separation of powers (legislative branch, executive branch, judicial branch)?
2. Separation of religion and state: Does the state in Islam favor the separation of religion from the state?
3. Democracy: Does the state in Islam comply with the understanding of democracy?
4. Multiparty democracy: Is multiparty democracy a legitimate concept in Islam?
5. Legitimacy of accessing power in Islam: Is the appointment of a ruler in Islam decided through elections, mandate appointment, or military victory?
6. Participative governance in Islam: Should the ruler run the state alone or through parallel agencies?
7. Appointment of government officials in Islam: Are they appointed by a religious council or through elections?
8. Leadership in Islam: Should the ruler be a theologian without governance experience, a Muslim without governance experience, or a non-Muslim with experience?

## Results of the Study

### Effect of the Political Affiliation Factor on Total Subjects' Positive Responses and Subjects' Attitude Change

Effect of Political Affiliation (PA) factor and Cognitively Dissonant Situations (CDS) on Subjects' Attitudes toward the Civil State

Table 1

| Factors             | Item 1   |       | Item 2   |       | Item 3   |       | Item 4   |      | Item 5   |       | Item 6   |       | Item 7   |       | Item 8                              |       |                  |      |      |     |      |      |
|---------------------|----------|-------|----------|-------|----------|-------|----------|------|----------|-------|----------|-------|----------|-------|-------------------------------------|-------|------------------|------|------|-----|------|------|
|                     | F (1.98) | Sig.  | F (1.98) | Sig.  | F (1.98) | Sig.  | F (1.98) | Sig. | F (1.98) | Sig.  | F (1.98) | Sig.  | F (1.98) | Sig.  | Appointment of government officials |       | Quality of Ruler |      |      |     |      |      |
|                     |          |       |          |       |          |       |          |      |          |       |          |       |          |       |                                     |       |                  |      |      |     |      |      |
| PA                  | 0.015    | 0.899 | 8.8      | 0.038 | 0.71     | 0.40  | 1.87     | 0.18 | 0.83     | 0.365 | 0.58     | 0.449 | 0.58     | 0.16  | 9.33                                | 0.003 | 0.65             | 0.42 | 1.64 | 0.2 | 0.42 | 0.65 |
| CDS                 | 0.81     | 0.18  | 23.32    | 0.001 | 16.93    | 0.001 | 3.73     | 0.06 | 2.86     | 0.093 | 1        | 0.319 | 1        | 0.84  | 3.04                                | 0.84  | -                | -    | -    | -   | -    | -    |
| Interaction PA/ CDS | 2.79     | 0.098 | 1.83     | 0.179 | 2.3      | 0.13  | 0.03     | 0.86 | 6.44     | 0.012 | 1        | 0.319 | 1        | 0.562 | 0.34                                | 0.562 | -                | -    | -    | -   | -    | -    |

### Effect of the Political Affiliation Factor on Total Subjects' Responses

Table 1 shows that, with the exception of Items 2 and 7, the political affiliation of subjects did not prove to be an influencing factor regarding their positive viewpoints on most questions of the study. This implies a general pattern that characterizes responses of subjects from both movements regarding separation of power, multiparty democracy, election of a ruler, and participative governance as well as a refusal of the election of a non-Muslim ruler. Differences are noted between subjects' responses from both groups especially on Items 2 and 7, where 26% of JDP subjects (average 0.26), as opposed to only 11% of JCM subjects (average 0.11), held positive views on the issue of Separation of Religion from State (Item 2), and 50% of JDP subjects (average 0.5) as opposed to 28% of JCM subjects (average 0.28) supported the idea of Elections as a means to appoint government officials (Item 7).

### Effect of Political Affiliation on Attitude Change

The non-significance of the interaction between the political affiliation factor and the CDS factor (Table 1), implies an absence of attitude-change in both JCM and JDP members for Item 6 regarding Participative Governance, as members of both groups held positive attitudes on this issue, before and after CDS. The same pattern is observed for Item 8 where the majority of subjects from both groups refuses a non-Muslim ruler, even if qualified, before and after CDS. Similarly, there is non-significance in the interaction between the Political Affiliation factor and the CDS factor on a number of items, which implies a similarity between subjects' responses with respect to Attitude Change. This is evident in Item 2 regarding the Separation between Religion and State, as a relative increase in subjects' positive responses is noted after CDS for both groups. As for Item 3 regarding Democracy, a relative decrease is noted in subjects' positive responses after CDS. A slight decrease is also noted in subjects' positive responses after CDS to Item 4 (Multiparty Democracy) and to Item 7 (Appointment of government officials in Islam), in both groups.

On the other hand, the significant interaction effect between the Political Affiliation factor and the CDS factor reveals differences in the direction of Attitude Change between the two groups, as shown in Item 5 (Legitimacy of access to power in Islam) and Item 1 (Separation of Powers), even if the significance in Item 1 is only marginal. A significant increase is also noted in subjects' positive responses for the members of JCM regarding item 5 after CDS, from 62% (average 0.62) to 72% (average 0.72) [ $t(49) = -2.33$ , level of significance 0.03], while the number of positive responses for subjects from 'JDP' remained stable before CDS (76%, average 0.76), and after CDS (74%, average 0.74) [ $t(49) = 1$ , level of significance .32]. As for Item 1 (Separation of Powers), a significant decrease is noted in subjects' positive responses after CDS for members of JDP, going from 74% (average 0.74) to 52% (average 0.52) [ $t(49) = 2.85$ , level of significance 0.006], as opposed to a relative stability in the number of subjects' positive responses for members of 'JCM' [ $t(49) = 0.53$ , level of significance 0.5], indicating 66% (average 0.66) of positive responses before CDS and 62% (average 0.62) of positive responses after CDS.

#### *Effect of CDS on Positive Attitude Change among Subjects from Total Sample*

Table 1 shows that the CDS factor is not significant in both Items 6 and 8 - which indicates a total absence of Attitude Change in both groups of the sample

- as most subjects, before and after CDS, support Participative Governance (Item 6) and are against Non-Muslim Experienced Leadership (Item 8).

On the other hand, CDS plays a crucial role in Items 1, 2 and 3 - indicating Attitude Change - as evident in the decrease in the number of positive responses regarding the Separation of Powers for the total number of subjects in the sample, from 70% (average 0.7) before CDS to 57% (average 0.57) after CDS, and from 73% (average 0.73) before CDS to 54% (average 0.54) after CDS, regarding the question on Democracy (Item 3). As for Item 2 (Separation of religion and state), a raise in Attitude Change is noted with an increase in subjects' positive responses from 6% (average 0.06) to 31% (average 0.31) after CDS.

Moreover, the level of the CDS effect for Items 4, 5 and 7 remains close to significance - indicating Attitude Change, though unclear - in the total number of subjects' responses, whereby a slight decrease is noted in number of subjects' positive responses regarding Multiparty Democracy (Item 4), after CDS, from 62% (average 0.62) to 50% (average 0.5), and regarding Appointment of government officials through Elections (Item 7), after CDS, from 41% (average 0.4) to 38% (average 0.38) while a slight increase in number of subjects' positive responses to Item 5 (Legitimacy of Elections for accessing power in Islam) is noted, from 69% (average 0.69) to 73% (average 0.73).



## Subjects' Expressed Formulations of Attitude-Change after CDS      Significance of Differences between Formulations of Attitude-Change

Table 2

|                                     |              | Attitude Against (%) | Integrated Attitude (%) | Attitude With (%) | $\chi^2$ (2) | Sig.   |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------|
| Item 1                              | JCM          | 20                   | 26                      | 46                | 4.6          | 0.05   |
| Separation of Powers                | JDP          | 16                   | 34                      | 40                | 5.2          | 0.07   |
|                                     | Total Sample | 18                   | 30                      | 43                | 10.3         | 0.0057 |
| Item 2                              | JCM          | 30                   | 66                      | 4                 | 29.09        | 0.0001 |
| Separation of Religion and State    | JDP          | 20                   | 72                      | 4                 | 39.5         | 0.0001 |
|                                     | Total Sample | 25                   | 69                      | 4                 | 97.98        | 0.0001 |
| Item 3                              | JCM          | 22                   | 40                      | 32                | 2.59         | 0.27   |
| Democracy                           | JDP          | 10                   | 50                      | 36                | 12.87        | 0.0016 |
|                                     | Total Sample | 16                   | 45                      | 34                | 13.87        | 0.0009 |
| Item 4                              | JCM          | 26                   | 28                      | 38                | 1.34         | 0.509  |
| Multiparty democracy                | JDP          | 18                   | 32                      | 40                | 3.59         | 0.165  |
|                                     | Total Sample | 22                   | 30                      | 39                | 4.76         | 0.092  |
| Item 5                              | JCM          | 26                   | 22                      | 52                | 7.944        | 0.0188 |
| Elections                           | JDP          | 24                   | 4                       | 72                | 36.56        | 0.0001 |
|                                     | Total Sample | 25                   | 13                      | 62                | 39.14        | 0.0001 |
| Item 6                              | JCM          | 12                   | 6                       | 80                | 52.81        | 0.0001 |
| Participative Governance            | JDP          | 4                    | 10                      | 82                | 85.8         | 0.0001 |
|                                     | Total Sample | 8                    | 8                       | 81                | 109.88       | 0.0001 |
| Item 7                              | JCM          | 32                   | 32                      | 26                | 0.4          | 0.818  |
| Appointment of Government Officials | JDP          | 20                   | 16                      | 48                | 10.85        | 0.004  |
|                                     | Total Sample | 26                   | 24                      | 37                | 3.379        | 0.184  |
| Item 8                              | JCM          | 36                   | 36                      | 16                | 4.54         | 0.102  |
| Non-Muslim Ruler                    | JDP          | 40                   | 36                      | 20                | 3.5          | 0.173  |
|                                     | Total Sample | 38                   | 36                      | 18                | 7.91         | 0.019  |

Based on Table 2, the following may be deduced:

*Non-significant presence of Attitude Change against the civil state*

The absence of a significant trend in antagonistic positions to the civil state across all eight items of the study after CDS implies that the overall trend for subjects' responses from both JCM and JDP is toward either a positive formulation of attitudes in favor

of the civil state, the formulation of an integrated attitude, or a fair distribution of mixed attitudes across all three positions.

*Significant presence of Attitude Change in favor of the civil state*

Based on the Chi-square results, there seems to be a significant, or near-significant, presence of attitudes in favor of the civil state, after CDS. This is evident

for Item 1 (Separation of Powers), where responses of JCM and JDC members reached significance and near-significance respectively; this may be due to the consistence of such an item with their collective memories of historical instances where the judges' orders overruled the Caliph's.

There is a strong trend toward "elections" as a means to access power (Item 5), as respondents resorted to historical events in Islam to justify their position; for example the proclamation of allegiance ("bay'ah") to the Prophet (PBUH) in Radwan, or to the Caliph Abu Bakr Al Siddiq in Saquifa, which, as per respondents' reports, was unprecedented. However, according to opinions stated by members of 'JCM', it was Muawiya Bin Abi Sufyan who turned the caliphate from an electoral system into a monarchy, an act they considered as an unforgivable crime. In this context, the boldness of Sunnis, especially members of JCM, is noted for its similarity with the Shia's stance against Muawiya Bin Abi Sufyan. What is also noticeable is that respondents adopt a form of 'deductive interpretation' to historical events in order to justify their positions on this issue; for the Prophet had not directly recommended any successor to his reign, which reinforces the idea that elections were the only legitimate means for the access to power.

For Item 6, it is noted that the formulations of attitudes for the majority of the subjects are in line with "Participatory Government", and subjects attribute their position to the concept of the "*Shura*" (Council) in Islam. Respondents' answers are rich in Quranic verses: "Ask for Allah's forgiveness for them; and consult them in affairs (of moment)", and "Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular Prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation; who spend out of what we bestow on them for sustenance",<sup>(39)</sup> and citations from the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (PBUH) and from Abu Hurairah (PBUH) who mentions that no one has ever consulted with his companions as much as the Prophet did. Although subjects from both groups consider political participation a religious duty, they disagree on the form of this participation; whereby members of JCM see it as a form of monitoring the performance of the rulers, denouncing any corruption and raising awareness to the people, members of JDP stress the

importance of integrating in governmental agencies and reforming them from the inside. Notably, the concept of consultation was used extensively by subjects across all the questionnaire items, as if it is used to bridge the gap between the civil state and the religious state.

For Item 7, a significant proportion of responses from members of JDP is in favor of "Electing government officials", as opposed to a non-significant proportion among members of JCM. Moreover, it is noted that those who responded in favor of electing government officials justify this using a form of retrospective analysis that blends the specifications of a modern state with particular events in Islamic history and highlights the similarities between these specifications and the events; for instance, they note that when Muslims conquered numerous territories, they kept their original rulers in function, which shows that appointing officials is done through the acceptance of the majority that will be ruled.

### Formulations of Integrated Attitudes

Formulations of Integrated Attitudes are significantly present in Item 2, for members of both JCM and JDP, and in Item 3 for members of JDP alone. For Item 2 which assesses the extent to which subjects are accepting of the idea of a civil state, it appears that 66% of 'JMC' members and 72% of 'JDP' members formulated Integrated Attitudes after CDS, affirming their willingness to accept a form of partial secularism that does not constitute, according to them, a sharp division between religion and state as is the case in the West, but consists of a systematic discrimination between religion, politics and governance (a scholarly stance that resembles, according to one of the respondents, that of Ibn Rushd as expressed in *The Decisive Treatise: Determining the Nature of the Connection between Religion and Philosophy*).

Hence, the role of Islam, as expressed by the subjects, is that of a binding moral contract requiring the respect of all. Any other form of moral contract, as long as it does not originate from Islamic divinity, will not have the same binding quality, nor will it be able to guide people on the righteous path. On the other hand, it is important not to involve Islam in random matters of science or knowledge for which Islam

39 The Koran, Trans. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, (3: 159) and (42: 38) respectively.

has no expertise, as such matters are associated with human effort and diligence. As for the outcomes of human diligence, they should be in harmony with the tenets of the *Shari'a*, and it is through such harmony that secularism can be Islamized, as one subject said.

It is noteworthy that only 4% of the total number of subjects expressed a positive attitude toward secularism in its “full version”, mentioning the example of the Turkish Justice and Development Party’s rise to power.

For Item 3, dealing with Democracy, around 50% of members of JDP formulated an Integrated Attitude characterized by an acceptance of democracy as long as it is monitored by a council of jurists whose role is to mend disputes between different political actors, ensure the stability of the country in transition phases, and prevent the country from falling into chaos.

#### Averaged Distribution of Subjects’ Formulations

The results of the Chi square test show an averaged distribution of attitude formulations regarding the civil state in the following items:

On Item 3 related to the concept of democracy, subjects from ‘JCM’ did not adopt a uniform attitude formulation; they are divided along three lines, which shows their lack of full understanding of the concept of democracy. This shows that the JCM hosts contradicting viewpoints regarding democracy, as is shown in Abdel Salam Yassin’s undermining of the value of democracy and distinguishing it from the concept of consultation (*Shura*) by stating that democracy is the art of managing differences while consultation integrates differences in an ideological way. As he claims, “Consultation refers to general satisfaction among the believers, an integration of emotions and faith, leading to a peaceful discussion, in which the righteous voice prevails<sup>(40)</sup>”. Furthermore, the inconsistency within the hierarchical structure of the JCM, which is founded on the idea of the “Modern Imam<sup>(41)</sup>”, and the engagement of JCM members in a number of civil protest movements (20 February) alongside rights-defending organizations and unions

in the call for a more democratic Morocco where the King oversees but does not rule, led to the inherent contradictions in attitudes within JCM. Thus, it is noted that 40% of them express an Integrated Attitude in favor of a partial democracy, or an Islamized democracy built on both the teachings of the Prophet (PBUH) and the concept of consultation (*Shura*), and which includes the “*Wilaya*” to strengthen the state, according to Abdel Salam Yassin<sup>(42)</sup>. The term “*Wilaya*” refers to a spiritual and symbolic state embodied by a spiritual guide or a God-chosen guardian who is respected by everyone and who can, through his advice and preaching, deliver people from the chaos that democracy plunges them in.

Table 2 also shows that 22% of subjects from JCM completely refuse any form of democracy, with the justification that it is an intrusive Western concept, preferring the consultation councils (*majalis al shura*) as the perfect system for governance. Consultation councils would be comprised of scholars and men of religion and jurisprudence with expertise in governance, which would thus avoid the ills of democracy.

On item 4 dealing with the concept of multiparty democracy, an absence of a clear formulation of attitude is noted for the members of both groups. Instead, they are divided along three lines, with 32% of JCM and 28% of JDP answering with Integrated Attitudes. Thus, members of the JDP said they were in favor of multiparty democracy as long as each party commits to Islamic values, be they socialists or liberals. As for members of JCM, they stated that they favor multiparty democracy as it is a means through which differences can be settled, and because they are committed to respecting secular, liberal and socialist parties, given that they are brothers in humanity. However, the purpose of the Islamists here is to merge everyone into the concepts of ‘brotherhood’, ‘synergy’ and ‘piety’, which is a means to reach the stage of consultation (since political differences will gradually wane, and the exemplary purpose will be to serve the country and worship God, transcending self-interests).

40 Abdessalam Yassine, *Shura and Democracy*, 2nd edition, (Beirut: Dar Luban Li-Tibaa wan-Nashr, 2003), p. 36.

41 The idea of an [Islamic] reformer imam, mentioned on the site of the “Justice and Charity”, remains less restrictive as compared to the concept of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih). However, it is difficult to talk about internal democracy within the community. See the website: <http://www.aljamaa.net>.

42 Abdessalam Yassine, *Dialogue of Past and Future*, (Casablanca: Al Ofok impressions, 1997), p. 27.

On the same item, 18% of JDP and 23% of JCM expressed radical refusal of multiparty democracy because, according to them, it leads to conflicts between citizens, as many have fallen victims to violence due to their extremism toward any given party. In their view, political parties trigger extremism and ‘whoever joins a party is a traitor’, as the saying goes. Islam, according to one of the JCM respondents, calls for brotherly harmony based on cooperation, mercy and mutual respect, and Islam refuses the logic of joining political parties for it leads to division, societal fragmentation and conflicts.

For Item 7 on the Appointment of government officials in Islam, moderate effects in the formulation of Attitudes are noted for JCM. Thirty-two percent expressed views refusing the idea of elections to choose government officials, and favored appointments made by a religious authority, because allowing citizens who live in conditions of poverty and illiteracy to elect representatives will lead, according to the respondents, to the buying of votes. In contrast, the same proportion of respondents (32%) expressed an Integrated Attitude, as they stressed the need for electoral candidates to be vetted by religious figures. Finally, 26% of JCM members favored the elections of government officials without any conditions.

For Item 8 dealing with Leadership in Islam, although there were no significant differences in the formulations

of attitudes from both groups concerning the necessity of having a Muslim ruler, there was a clear difference for the subjects of the JCM in the partial comparisons between the “Integrated Attitude” and the “Attitude With” categories [ $\chi^2(1)=3.846$ , significance level 0.049], and between the “Integrated Attitude” and “Attitude Against” categories [ $\chi^2(1)=3.846$ , significance level 0.049]. The difference is near-significant for ‘JCM’ when the “Attitude Against” and the “Attitude With” categories are compared [ $\chi^2(1)=3.33$ , significance level 0.068], which leads to the conclusion that there is an overwhelming presence of both the “Attitude Against” and the “Integrated Attitude” categories. This reflects total adherence to the idea that a religious figure should be the head of state due to the fact that a God-fearing ruler would be fair in governance (“Attitude Against”), or the idea that the ruler needs to be a Muslim but not necessarily a religious figure (“Integrated Attitude”), versus the total absence of responses in the “Attitude With” category, which favors the access of a non-Muslim to power. Subjects justify their positions by saying that there has never been a Muslim or a Buddhist ruler in Western democracies, and that Islam, being a way of life, plays a key role in the identity of the citizens. Thus accepting a non-Muslim ruler for Morocco would be similar to accepting a non-Moroccan to rule over the country, and this would be considered colonialism.

## Interpretation of Results and Discussion

Based on the field data results, two central questions can be raised for analysis and discussion: How is stability evident in the stance of Islamist Moroccans toward the civil state? And how are transformations evident?

### Manifestations of Fixed Attitudes of Moroccan Islamists

This question is dealt with by looking at, first, the fixed attitudes expressed by both members of the JCM and the JDP on particular items of the questionnaire regarding the civil state (between-groups analysis) and second, the fixed attitudes expressed by members within each group on particular items of the questionnaire regarding the civil state, even after exposure to CDS (within-groups analysis).

### Between-Groups Fixed Attitudes

The absence of significant differences in subjects’ responses between the JCM and the JDP on a number of questions clearly shows that both groups hold similar stances regarding some of the constituents of the civil state, despite ideological differences between them. For instance, activists from both groups almost unanimously refuse the idea of a non-Muslim ruler, even if experienced, as well as the adoption of participative governance, a unanimity that was maintained even after exposure to CDS. Moreover, a relative similarity at the level of attitude change is noted between members of both groups regarding their stances about secularism, democracy, political pluralism and election of government officials. An agreement is also noted between groups regarding the legitimacy of elections as a means for accessing power,

as well as a partial and cautious acceptance, from both groups, of democracy and political pluralism. This partial acceptance has led to the adoption of “Integrated Attitudes” which often fell in the line of “Islamization of democracy and political pluralism”.

The source of this uniformity in attitudes between the two groups is believed to stem from a dominant ideological orientation, a *Doxa*<sup>(43)</sup>, to which a wide range of Muslims, including Islamists, submit. The *Doxa* is a collective schema that guides people’s awareness and interpretive operations into adopting common positions and perceiving those schematic constituents as non-negotiable facts. The concept of the *Doxa* is evident in subjects’ consideration of Islam as the model for good governance, void of all evil. For the subjects, Islamic governance is the viable alternative to the greedy liberalist or the all-encompassing socialist regimes, as it embodies final solutions to the economic, social and political problems that our societies are currently facing. Such a view is further promoted by a big number of satellite television channels and websites and is widely accepted by ordinary Muslims, Islamists and others. Similarly, this view is also embedded in the academic discourse of liberal-oriented Arab states, as in the example of the philosophy course in Morocco which delineates the Islamic economic model as a fair and moderate model that opposes the excesses and avoids the failures of both liberalism and socialism<sup>(44)</sup>.

It is widely accepted that Islamists reached power after the Arab Spring, not because of the strength of their electoral programs or electoral campaigns, but mainly due to the notion that ‘an Islamic model of governance is the only alternative’ which is deeply engrained in people’s minds. It is worth noting that the tendency to glorify economic and political models is not restricted to the example of Islam; a number of Europeans have also used the *Doxa* in their adherence to the liberal system. A recent study by Chabrak et al. revealed a number of French students in an economics course hailed the liberal model and refused to criticize it as the cause for the global economic crisis, despite

the fact that they were presented with evidence showing its flaws<sup>(45)</sup>.

The main problem lies in the simple citizen who supported the Islamists and placed high hopes on their governmental experience and their potential to fulfill all of his/her dreams; Islamic governance, according to him or her, is guided by absolutism and sacredness. Recent political developments, however, have revealed to the Islamists themselves the difficulties they are facing in fulfilling, even only partially, the ambitions of the people. Faced with this situation, the discourse of many Islamist political figures is shifting from “absolutism” to “relativism” with the underlying idea that the experience of Islamist governance is a human struggle and not an absolute, sacred and flawless experience. Seen from a humanistic-political perspective, this is a positive sign toward the removal of the idea of Islamic governance from the collective *Doxa*.

The infallibility of the attribution of sacredness to the idea of Islamic governance is due to a confirmation proneness<sup>(46)</sup>, a cognitive operation to which Islamist adherents resort, reformulating their ideas of the civil state in a way to match their previously held concepts of the Islamic state. They usually end up with integrated positions bearing titles such as: the Islamization of democracy, the Islamization of political pluralism, and the Islamization of secularism. However, when faced with cognitively dissonant statements that contradict their ideology and that cannot be confirmed using an Islamist frame, then they resort to an outright rejection of the statement. This is shown in the subjects’ radical rejection of the idea of a non-Muslim ruler, in spite of his leadership qualifications.

Such tendencies for confirming politico-religious convictions and beliefs through the selection of some of the constituents of the civil state and accommodating them to fit the original model result in the process of Islamization, which is described

43 Nihel Chabrak and Russell Craig, “Student Imaginings, Cognitive Dissonance and Critical Thinking,” *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, vol. 24, no. 2 (March, 2013).

44 Ministère d’éducation nationale et de formation des cadres, *Manuel scolaire de la pensée islamique et de la philosophie*, Baccalauréat (Rabat: Imprimerie Almaref, 1979), p. 537.

45 Chabrak and Craig, “Student Imaginings”.

46 Clifton E. Brown, Mark E. Peecher and Ira Solomon, “Auditors’ Hypothesis Testing in Diagnostic Inference Tasks,” *Journal of Accounting Research*, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1999), p. 11.

by Abdel Salam Yassin, leader of JCM in his book entitled *'The Islamization of Modernity'*<sup>(47)</sup>, as the process of removing the civil state from "*Dar al Kufr*" (the house of blasphemy) to "*Dar al Islam*" (the house of Islam). Calling on non-Muslims to convert into Islam is understandable, but what is incomprehensible is Islamizing abstract concepts related to the civil state. This is similar to what McGraw and Dolan<sup>(48)</sup> call personification, the act of attributing human qualities to abstract entities. Such personification is not innocent as it aims to influence the minds of the masses who find it difficult to understand abstract discourse on state institutions, constitutions and rules. When these are translated into more personified terms, then it becomes easy for the ordinary citizen to process them without any strenuous mental effort. Thus, it is not surprising to see how Islamist discourse includes such expressions as an "atheist parliament, a blasphemous law or a depraved constitution".

### Within-Groups Fixed Attitudes

The fact that the vast majority of respondents from both groups rejected the idea of a non-Muslim ruler, even if qualified, before and after CDS, shows a firmly fixed attitude in rejecting any proposition for a non-Muslim ruler to a Muslim state. This is an identity issue and it is non-negotiable. Moreover, the mere proposal of the idea of a non-Muslim ruler is perceived by a large number of subjects as provocative and disturbing with around 30% of them reacting in a negative way: 'Are you crazy for suggesting this to me'; 'this is not a study, this is an insult'; 'you need to stop asking such questions'. This is thus a complex, unsolvable situation where the possibility of integrating the politico-religious commitments of the subjects with one of the basic tenets of the civil state, namely the neutralization of the role of religion in the selection of the ruler, is non-existent. Moreover, it is perceived as an identity-threatening situation, which explains the emergence of the subjects' negative reactions. On the other hand, a large number of subjects favored the idea of a Muslim ruler over a non-Muslim country, since a Muslim is, in their opinion, more just and

humane than a non-Muslim. This is by no means a racist or discriminative stance; it is to be understood through the lens of social psychology as a process of in-group favoritism - a normal behavior in community dynamics<sup>(49)</sup>.

It is worth noting that 8% of JCM and 10% of JDP subjects accept the idea of a non-Muslim ruler, provided he reached power through a candid and honest election process, for the will of the people should be respected, and if half of the population is non-Muslim, then it is possible to elect a non-Muslim ruler. This is explained in line with the concept of implicit social cognition where some people may belong to a group, without necessarily adopting, partially or entirely, the group's beliefs. Thus, belonging is not the same as believing<sup>(50)</sup>; for instance, an individual may have joined a group because some of his peers or family members had joined, or because he is sufficiently appreciated by the group's members.

Directly opposed to absolute rejection, the absolute acceptance pole is noted with regard to the concept of participative governance for both groups, before and after CDS. This is discussed in line with the concept of attitude accessibility, where the individual easily agrees with positions without any objection, due to the presence of cognitive consonance between her ideological reference ('the principle of *Shura* in Islam') and the civil translations of that principle, an ideal situation which has incited the majority of subjects to formulate an "Attitude With".

### Manifestations of Changing Attitudes of Moroccan Islamists

Based on the field results of this study, it can be concluded that the pattern of changing attitudes differs between the two groups, as well as between the members within the same group before and after CDS.

### Between-Groups Differences in Attitudes

Between-groups differences highlight the important role politics plays in forging the attitudes of the subjects of both groups towards secularism and

47 Abdessalam Yassine, *Islamiser la modernité* (Rabat: Al Ofok impressions, 1998).

48 Kathleen M. McGraw and Thomas M. Dolan, "Personifying the State: Consequences for Attitude Formation," *Political Psychology*, vol. 28, no. 3 (June, 2007), p. 299.

49 Marilyn B. Brewer, «The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Social Categorization, Ingroup Bias, and Outgroup Prejudice,» in: Kruglanski and Higgins, eds., p. 695.

50 Nosek, Graham and Hawkins, p. 550.

the election of government officials. It is noted that JDP subjects are more likely than JCM to support the concept of secularism and the idea of electing government officials as opposed to appointing them. The flexibility of JDP responses is due to the actual JDP experience of governance and its responsibilities. According to a study by Sagie et. al.<sup>(51)</sup>, individuals who have held public functions and taken decisions, strategic or tactical, relating to public good, are more likely to adapt themselves to positions that run counter to their beliefs. Thus the experience the JDP has had in a number of governmental institutions (parliament, ministries, municipalities, consultancy councils) as well as its active presence in civil society (unions, parties, associations), compared to JCM, has contributed to the flexibility and pragmatism of its political stances, including its stance toward secularism, which for many Islamists is synonymous to atheism. On the other hand, as JCM has rejected any form of dialogue with the current political system, and retracted itself from the official public platform, it deals with a number of issues without any flexibility, realism or political pragmatism. This is evident in the higher number of negative responses to the concept of secularism and election of government officials among JCM subjects, as opposed to JDP subjects.

It is worth noting that the hierarchical structure of the JCM (similar to that of the Shias), led by the Modern Imam who controls the different powers, influences JCM subjects' preference for the concept of the Imam (the mentor) appointing government officials over the concept of elections - a fact that highlights the important role the Imam plays for JCM. His writings constitute their sole political, religious and educational reference. Thus, in their responses, the JCM subjects remained loyal to their Imam's interpretations of the Quran and the *Sunna*, as he is considered the "*Umma's* rejuvenator". Thus, it would seem that the picture for JCM is one of political dogmatism, as described by Hunt and Miller<sup>(52)</sup>, where dogmatic individuals tend to be less tolerant of opinions that are counter to their beliefs, for they are incapable of

explaining or assimilating them. This is evident in the JCM claiming that theirs is a democratic Islamist movement which rejects the King's monopoly over all powers, yet asserts the importance of appointing government officials via the religious authority to whom loyalty must be granted in order to ensure the unity of the *Umma* and avoid chaos (*fitna*). Our prototypical description of JCM does not differ much from that of the conservative republicans who reject a number of liberal values such as recognizing the rights of ethnic and cultural minorities, yet call for a free society.

In terms of changing attitudes, the difference remains clear between the two groups regarding the concept of elections as the means to access power: JDP subjects showed a relative stability in the number (which was already high) of their positive responses before and after CDS, as opposed to the increase in the number of positive responses for JCM subjects after CDS. This implies that the CDS factor did indeed trigger a cognitive dissonance in JCM subjects, leading them to question and revise their initially held beliefs. This is in line with what Siegler<sup>(53)</sup> calls the operation of microgenetic learning, a form of spontaneous and instant learning that may lead to drastic attitudinal changes in one's system of beliefs. Such type of change was clearly revealed in the big rise of the number of JCM responses toward an "Attitude With" position, implying that JCM perceptions of issues related to the civil state, including the question of elections as a means to access power, should not be qualified as static; instead, they are to be viewed as flexible and prone to change when faced with strong counter-arguments.

The differences in attitude changes between the two groups are also evident in the decrease in the number of responses in favor of the Separation of State and Religion for the JDP subjects, compared to the relative stability in number of responses for JCM subjects. The reason why JDP members retreated from their initially held positive views after CDS highlights the strategy of flexible hypocrisy<sup>(54)</sup> used by JDP activists,

51 Abraham Sagie, Dov Elizur and Meni Koslowsky, "Effect of Participation in Strategic and Tactical Decisions on Acceptance of Planned Change," *Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 130, no. 4 (1990), p. 459.

52 Hunt and Miller, Cités par: M-A. Martinie and V. Fointiat, "Enfreindre sans craindre: Tolérance à la dissonance dans le paradigme de l'hypocrisie induite," *Psychologie française*, vol. 55, no. 1 (Mars, 2010), p. 43

53 Robert S. Siegler, "Microgenetic Studies of Self-Explanation," in: Nira Granott and Jim Parziale, eds., *Microdevelopment: Transition Processes in Development and Learning*, Cambridge Studies in Cognitive Perceptual Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 31.

54 Martinie and Fointiat, p. 41.

where public speech differs from private convictions, as a strategy to precipitate their access to power. In that context, JDP had to reassure significant segments of the population that, should they reach power, they will not be a disrupting force. They had to convince the democratic parties and public opinion that they are supportive of democracy, free and fair elections, political pluralism and separation of powers. They were also compelled to reassure the King of Morocco that they embrace the notion of separation of powers.

The differences in attitude changes between JCM and JDP are clearly shown in the way subjects' attitude formulations are distributed for each group. For example, while there was a general pattern of uniformity of attitudes among the JDP subjects regarding the questionnaire items (with the exception of Item 4 on Multiparty Democracy), there is a noticeable fragmentation of attitudes among the JCM subjects on a number of items, especially on democracy, political pluralism and elections. The reason for such fragmentation is the glaring contradiction between the JCM internal constitution founded on religious authority on the one hand, and its members' defense of democracy and political pluralism in public on the other. It is worth noting that the same situation often takes place with republicans in the USA, as they live and raise their children on conservative values, all the while defending liberal values in public. This duality experienced by members of JCM appears to negatively affect their mental executive functions<sup>(55)</sup> as their thinking is split between two schemata: the first schema being that of the Guiding Imam, his views and vision which are the sacred reference for the movement, thus justifying his monopoly of power, and the second schema consisting of the number of positions that align with the values of the civil state. Their mental executive functions are limited in the sense that they cannot efficiently inhibit one of the tracks at the expense of the other, which is why their views seem dispersed and they are incapable of processing and analyzing

both tracks in their full complexities, thus formulating an "Integrated Attitude"<sup>(56)</sup>.

### Within-Groups Differences in Attitudes

The change of attitudes after CDS of the subjects within each group takes either an ascending or a descending direction with regard to any of the items about the civil state:

#### a) The ascending change in positive attitudes

This change is evident in the increase of the number of positive responses held towards secularism and elections, which shows that subjects perceive both concepts as negotiable. However, in spite of the fact that the biggest proportion of subjects' "Attitude With" responses was obtained for the question on Elections as the sole legitimate means to access power, the majority of attitudes towards secularism did not exceed the "Integrated Attitude" category. It is thus clear that CDS did activate a form of internal cognitive struggle, and that the subjects tried to resolve the situation by elaborating an integrated formula blending the concept of the civil state into their religious perceptions and references. This resulted in the adoption of integrated formulations such as: 'Yes for partial secularism, as long as it is under an Islamic guise and especially in the realm of morality, but when it comes to more specialized domains, we need to allow the human mind to find solutions'.

#### b) The descending change in positive attitudes:

Based on the results, a retraction of positive attitudes was noticed in subjects regarding some of the concepts of the civil state, such as democracy, separation of powers, the elections of government officials and political pluralism. Such a retraction is due, in our opinion, to the fact that CDS was an unexpected factor<sup>(57)</sup>, for the subjects had not expected that the researcher, perceived as a liberal academic, would assume the role and speech of a religious guide who would present them with counterarguments against the civil state. This is in line with what the "new

55 Fayeza S. Ahmed and L. Stephen Miller, "Executive Function Mechanisms of Theory of Mind," *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders*, vol. 41, no. 5 (May, 2011), p. 667.

56 Allen R. McConnell and Christina M. Brown, "Dissonance Averted: Self-Concept Organization Moderates the Effect of Hypocrisy on Attitude Change," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 46, no. 2 (March, 2010), p.361.

57 Jonathon R. B. Halbesleben and M. Ronald Buckley, "Social Influences on Performance Evaluation: Implications for the Development of Performance Standards," *Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship*, vol. 14, no. 3 (2009), p. 74.



look”<sup>(58)</sup> of cognitive dissonance theory postulates, whereby people, when faced with an unexpected dissonant situation, tend to resort to their original perceptions to solve issues and protect themselves<sup>(59)</sup>.

Hence, the assumption is that Islamists have two attitudes: An implicit one which is against the civil state, and an open one, which is in favor of the civil state. People, according to the theory of implicit social cognition, do not always state what they truly believe in; sometimes people talk about issues that run counter to their beliefs, and it suffices to be embarrassed or provoked by one question for them to retract and declare our true beliefs<sup>(60)</sup>. Therefore, the retraction in the subjects’ positive attitudes toward the civil state, after CDS, may be interpreted as some form of belief dissimulation<sup>(61)</sup> (*‘taqiya’*) on behalf of the subjects to better match the beliefs of the other, the other being, in this case, the present researcher. Such a strategy is used, according to the theory of Impression Management<sup>(62)</sup>, to influence the other and gain his sympathy and promote a positive image of one’s group as willing to interact with the concepts of the civil state. This behavior was very evident among Islamists after the September 11 events, where several moderate Islamist groups sought to ease Western public opinion by stressing their adherence to democratic values, human rights and modernity. During the Arab Spring, some Western officials, such as Obama, Cameron and Alain Juppé, did not hesitate to state their approval of Islamists coming to power, and their belief that Islam is not opposed to democracy. Within this vein, Juppé literally stated on *Al Jazeera*: ‘Previous leaders have provided us with incorrect information on Islam and Islamists, whereas Islam is compatible with democracy’<sup>(63)</sup>.

#### *Differences between subjects of the same group*

Subjects within the JCM did not express a uniform position regarding democracy, political pluralism and the election of government officials, as their responses

were distributed across “Attitude With”, “Attitude Against” and “Integrated Attitude”. The same trend was observed for subjects in JDP regarding the question dealing with political pluralism. This means facing ‘between-subject’ differences, in the sense that there is a difference of attitude between subjects within the same group regarding certain issues. As for JCM, the source of this ‘between-subject’ difference is, according to this research, a flaw in its ideological discourse which has not allowed for its members to develop a unified position. Members of JCM experience a sharp contradiction between, the theocratic constitution of their movement, where all powers are in the Imam’s hands, and, on the other hand, their struggle for a more democratic Morocco, where the King would not wield all powers. This has resulted in the fluctuations of JCM responses between acceptance of full-fledged democracy and a form of Islamized democracy whereby electoral candidates are vetted by religious figures. The same fluctuation is evident in the inability of JCM members to compromise between their struggle for advocating, in public, freedom of speech and political pluralism, and their restricted understanding of the world through their adherence to the discourse and vision of their Imam, as they consider – in Karniol’s words<sup>(64)</sup> – that everything that comes out of their Imam, even his movements, constitutes a model that everyone should adhere to.

As for JDP, the differences between subjects’ formulations of attitude regarding political pluralism are based on the contradictions within the Party’s politics on the one hand (i.e. between its self-claimed openness to democratic forces and public political participation), and on the other hand, its implicit call on other political parties to abandon their democratic views and adopt Islamism. In other words, there is a call to Islamize political parties and Islamize political pluralism.

58 E. Eser Telci, Ceyda Maden and Deniz Kantur, “The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Marketing and Management Perspective,” *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, vol. 24 (2011), pp. 378.

59 Carl P. Maertz, Ahmad Hassan and Peter Magnusson, “When Learning Is not Enough: A Process Model of Expatriate Adjustment as Cultural Cognitive Dissonance Reduction,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, vol. 108, no. 1 (January 2009), p. 66, and Halbesleben and Buckley, p. 74.

60 Nosek, Graham and Hawkins, p. 549.

61 N. Epley and A. Waytz, *Mind Perception* (In Press).

62 James T. Tedeschi, ed., *Impression Management Theory and Social Psychological Research* (New York: Academic Press, 1981), p. 12.

63 Interview with Alain Juppé, French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, *Aljazeera*, New York, September 22, 2011.

64 Rachel Karniol, “Egocentrism Versus Protocentrism: The Status of Self in Social Prediction,” *Psychological Review*, vol. 110, no. 3 (July 2003), p. 564.

## Conclusions and Limitations

The findings of the study allow the prediction of respondents' attitudes regarding the civil state, based on their political affiliation, in relation to the items of (1) the elections of government officials and (2) secularism. Here it is noted that JDP subjects are more open to the liberal schema and more acceptant of these two items than JCM, which remains loyal to the conservative schema. Further validating this conclusion is the high number of positive attitudes for JDP towards the election item before and after CDS, describing it as the only legitimate means to access power, while the figures for JCM rose only after the subjects' exposure to CDS.

Similarly, attitude change was shown in JDP subjects in more than one instance in the form of flexible hypocrisy. Thus, "integrated attitudes" are more common among JDP subjects than among JCM subjects, which clearly reveals that JDP is willing to negotiate and search for compromising formulas between their religious perceptions and the concept of the civil state. In contrast, the average distribution of attitude formulations among subjects of JCM shows their incapability, as conservatives, to process contradictions in their stance regarding the civil state and negotiating these to reach compromising answers in the form of "integrated attitudes".

Given that the hypothesis concerning political affiliation remains limited in a number of items, this

points to the presence of a general cognitive and ideological mindset for both movements, guiding them both toward the same options, in line with the *Doxa*. This is manifested in the similarity in the trends for attitude change between the two groups on a number of items.

The categorical description of both movements as one being conservative and the other being liberal remains a point of discussion, especially given that subjects of JCM express their readiness to revise their views regarding elections after CDS and adopt positive attitudes toward this question; this implies a flaw in attributing openness and pragmatism exclusively to members of JDP, and not to members of JCM.

As for the sample of the study, the CDS has revealed the presence of a solid nucleus of non-negotiable Islamist perceptions regarding the civil state, which includes the principle of participative governance in relation to the concept of the "*Shura*" (consultation), the backbone of the Islamic model of governance. This nucleus also includes the rejection of a non-Muslim ruler, while the remaining attitudes (including that toward secularism) seem open to negotiation and revision, thus showcasing the importance of perception and context for the Islamists' attitude towards the civil state.

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